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Chapter One: Introduction
Eighteenth-century American politics does more than simply provide us with the US
Constitution. According to Gordon Wood (1991, 32), the stakes of eighteenth-century historical
arguments are very high, as they deal with “nothing less than the kind of society we have been,
or ought to become.” Barry Shain (1994, xiv) concurs with Wood, arguing that an understanding
of the American founding “defines how Americans understand themselves as a historical people,
as well as constraining what they might become.” As Wood and Shain indicate, an understanding
of eighteenth-century American political thought shapes how we understand our past and
informs the decisions we make about our future.
Despite the consensus on the importance of our eighteenth-century political thinking,
scholars continue to debate how these political principles should be understood. When
considering the question of how we should understand the government created by the US
Constitution, scholars take a bifurcated view of what is called the federal/national question. This
question concerns where sovereignty is located in the American political system. On one side,
federalists maintain that sovereignty resides with the states (Van Tyne 1907; Berger 1987;
Bennett 1942). While these scholars disagree with regard to the question of how long America
has been committed to federalism, they all agree that American political thinking and practice
rejects the idea of national sovereignty. For federalists, America is properly thought of in terms
of citizens of sovereign states, independent of each other, who are linked together only by
common interest.
In opposition, nationalists maintain that the Constitution is grounded on a commitment to
popular sovereignty. In other words, that sovereignty is located in the hands of the American
people in their collective capacity (Wood 1977; Breen 1997; Ferguson 2000). Where nationalists
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disagree with one another is on the question of where America’s commitment to national,
popular sovereignty comes from. Answers to this question include the following: 1)
nationalism’s origins can be traced to our colonial experience (Wood 1998; Rossiter 1966), 2)
nationalism developed between 1776 and 1787 (Green 1986), 3) national sovereignty is a
completion of the principles of the American Revolution (Diamond 1992), and 4) a consequence
of decisions made by the particular delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Wolfe 1977;
Onuf 1988; Jensen 1943; Roche 1961).
A third, hybrid approach attempts to reconcile the bifurcated positions on the
federal/national question. Here, scholars contend that the ideological struggle between federalists
and nationalists is between delegates from small and large states (Diamond 1992; Powell 1987;
McDonald 1985). In making this argument, these scholars concur with James Madison in
Federalist #39 that the Constitution is partly federal and partly national (#39; 199). Maybe more
importantly, these scholars take seriously Madison’s warnings in Federalist #37 about the
problems inherent in language. On these problems, Madison writes, “…The obscurity arising
from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through
which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh embarrassment” (#37:
183). Here, Madison suggests that the imperfection of language has the effect of rendering
complex ideas and concepts more obscure. He writes, “The faculties of the mind itself have
never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the
most acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37: 182). Thus, if the requisite precision lies
beyond the capacities of the “most acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37: 182), it is
reasonable to conclude that this level of precision is beyond the capabilities of the delegates.

-5-

Despite their differences, all three bodies of scholarship share a common assumption: that
the US Constitution is informed by a coherent understanding of sovereignty. Mogg (2006)
analyzes Madison’s Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention, and tests the assumption
that there is a single, coherent understanding of sovereignty that informs the arguments and
decisions of the delegates to the Convention. Employing a methodological approach where she
constructs the political positions of each delegate over the course of the entire Convention, Mogg
finds that the Constitution is informed by a single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty.
Unlike the federalists, the nationalists, and the hybrid camp, Mogg demonstrates that the theory
of sovereignty found at the Convention employs a conceptual distinction between principle and
derived sovereignty. The first concept deals with the authority from which power is derived and
Mogg (2006, 3) refers to this as principle sovereignty. The second concept deals with the
exercise of power and is referred to as derived sovereignty (Mogg 2006, 3). The fact that
delegates to the Convention employ two competing operationalizations of principle sovereignty
explains, according to Mogg, why scholars have not been able to resolve the federal/national
tension.
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Mogg’s argument, it would be premature to
conclude that the theory she identifies animates the American political system. This is the case
for two reasons. First, her analysis focuses exclusively on Madison’s Notes. Bilder (2015, 3)
concludes that the Notes constitute “one man’s view of the writing of a constitution...” and not an
adequate account of the Constitution’s meaning. More importantly, Bilder argues that Madison
only returned to the Notes in response to the specific challenges faced by the new government
and the political ideas of Thomas Jefferson. Thus, not only did Madison revise his Notes more
than previously thought, the documents were altered throughout the entirety of his life with an
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eye to his evolving vision of republican government. One way to deal with the unreliability of
Madison’s Notes is to focus on the reportedly more reliable Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787 by Farrand (1937). Studies using this text are limited because they focus only on the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. Drawing a distinction between original intent and original
understanding, second, suggests that these studies focus exclusively on the topic of original
intent which can be understood as the “meaning the Framers—the delegates who drafted the
document in 1787—intended the Constitution to have” (Maggs 2009, 461). In contrast, original
understanding can be understood as “what the persons who participated in the state ratifying
conventions thought the Constitution meant” (Maggs 2009, 461). As potential sources for
understanding the Constitution, James Madison suggests that original understanding is preferable
to original intent. Speaking in the First Congress, Madison argues:
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who formed our
Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in
expounding the Constitution. As the instrument came from them it was nothing more than
the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed into it by
the voice of the people, speaking through the State Conventions. If we were to look,
therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must
look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions,
which accepted and ratified the Constitution (quoted in Maggs 2009, 458-59).
Following Madison’s recommendation, this project tests for the presence of the theory of
sovereignty found by Mogg (2006) in the Massachusetts State Ratifying Convention (17871788) and the Virginal Ratifying Convention (1788).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides an
overview of the methodological approach used here. The final section contains overviews of the
chapters focusing on the Massachusetts (Chapter Two) and Virginia (Chapter Three) Ratifying
Conventions as well as the conclusion (Chapter Four).
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Methodological Approaches to the Ratification Debates
In looking at the Massachusetts and Virginia Ratifying Conventions, one is presented
with two general approaches and both are limited. Scholars studying the state ratifying
conventions generally apply the methodologies used by scholars studying the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. A standard way to approach the study of the Constitutional Convention is to
focus on issues of contention (see Rakove 1987; Diamond 1992; McDonald 1985 & 2004;
Powell 1987; Rossiter 1966; Wood 1998; Jilson 1981 & 1988). This means that scholars focus
on the understandings of ideas as proposed by the delegates. These scholars study these ideas to
have a more robust understanding of the delegate’s positions on them. A consequence of this
approach is to relegate the delegates to a position of secondary importance behind ideas.
Another approach, one that recognizes the importance of the delegates, emphasizes the
role played by political and commercial interests (see Jensen 1943; Onuf 1988; Morgan 1988;
Wolfe 1977, Roche 1966; Beard 1935). For these scholars, the Constitution is best viewed as the
means to securing personal aggrandizement and not a consequence of any overarching principles
or ideas. At the state level, Van Beck Hall (1972) uses quantitative analysis to demonstrate that
Massachusetts politics between 1780 and 1791 is driven by socioeconomic influences. In
particular, his analysis demonstrates that the split between Massachusetts’ coastal economic
centers and its inland rural/agricultural regions explains Massachusetts’ politics generally and
that ratification of the Constitution can be viewed as affirmation of the belief that the
Constitution would advance the commercial interests of the state’s commercial centers. The
problem here is that this approach rejects the idea that ideas matter and only views political
actors as being motivated by self-interest. While such an approach does explain a great deal of
political behavior, it does not explain all political behavior. In particular, it does not explain
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political decisions of monumental significance like ratification. What is needed instead is an
approach that takes the individual delegates seriously as well as the importance of political ideas.
Mogg does this by examining each of the delegate’s arguments and reasoning for or against all
issues that arise, looking specifically for insight into their position on sovereignty. While this
study will follow the lead of Mogg and examine the delegates on all issues raised, special
attention will be given to the indicators of sovereignty identified by Mogg (2006, 7-12). These
indicators are summarized in Table 1.
For each delegate, I will take their respective positions on sovereignty and create
vignettes that bring together their statements over the course of the entire convention. I will take
their respective positions on sovereignty and create vignettes that bring together their statements
over the course of the entire convention. Using the vignettes, I will classify the delegates. In
particular, I will look to classify the delegates based on their positions on where principle
sovereignty is located (people of the Unites States, people of the particular states, or the state
governments) and their view of derived sovereignty (strong national government, strong national
government in need of greater checks, and weak national government/strong state governments).
Vignettes for classifiable delegates from the Massachusetts and Virginia Ratifying Conventions
are provided in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively.
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Table 1: Indicators of Popular Sovereignty
and its Two Dimensions

Popular Sovereignty

Principle Sovereignty

Derived Sovereignty

•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•

•

Election to the First
and Second Branches
of the Legislature
Selection of the
Executive
Qualifications to hold
Public Office
Issues dealing with
the Admission of New
States
Removal of the
Executive
Executive Veto
Terms of Office in
First and Second
Branch as well as
Executive
Qualifications to vote

•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ratification through
the People or States
Ratification
Unanimous or Partial
Payment of
Legislature through
State or General
Treasury
Suffrage in First and
Second Branches of
Legislature
Election to First and
Second Branches of
Legislature
Selection of Executive
Selection of Judges
Requirement of Oaths
of Office
Position of States at
Convention (are they
sovereign?)
Use of term National
v. Confederate
Government
Origination of Money
Bills

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The Ends/Purpose of
Government
Negative on State
Laws
Position on Treaties
Positions on Treason
Inferior Tribunals
Direct Taxation
Taxing Exports
Joint Office Holding
(National & State)
Authority to Subdue
Rebellion
Uniformity in the
Militia
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Chapter Overviews
The second chapter of this Honors Thesis focuses on the Massachusetts Ratifying
Convention. Despite being a rather large convention, with more than 350 delegates present, the
debate was very limited in its discussion of the Constitution. The debate mainly addressed the
issues of derived sovereignty and, more specifically, Article I, Section 8. Beyond this, however,
the debate did cover more topics, just to a lesser extent than derived sovereignty. In terms of
principle sovereignty, the delegates were mainly in agreement that the people should hold this
power. Following Shays Rebellion and other atrocities committed under the Articles of
Confederation, including the general understanding that the Articles were insufficient to the
needs of the people, the people of Massachusetts were wildly interested in having the people be
the sole principle to the general government rather than the state governments. The fear of the
current political climate and the general understanding across society that the state governments
alone were insufficient in protecting the will of the people was enough fuel to convince most of
the delegates to the Massachusetts convention that the people should be principle. To this end,
they mainly agreed that the people should be principle, but some delegates did propose an
alternate understanding that the people of the state should be principle. More abstract thinking in
terms of what government should look like is seen in Massachusetts than in Virginia. The main
source of tension in Massachusetts in this convention was with derived sovereignty. The
delegates greatly disagreed on the extent of power which the general government could hold,
most delegates finding issues with Article 1 Section 8 in particular. The idea that Congress
should hold the powers of both the purse and the sword was too much for many delegates, and
they thought that these rights should either not be vested to the same branch of government or
they should have more sufficient checks on them if they are going to remain in the document.
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The delegates who held the understanding that these two powers should not be vested in the
same body, or in the general government at all for that matter, mostly voted against ratification.
Those delegates who held the latter position, however, that more checks on this power would be
necessary, developed the idea of adding amendments to the document. The most important thing
to come out of the Massachusetts convention was this idea of adopting amendments. The idea
that a sort of bill of rights should be included in the Constitution originated from this convention,
and it had the ability to change the votes of some delegates from opposed to voting to in favor of
ratification sway votes against the document to instead vote to ratify, resulting in the overall
decision to ratify in Massachusetts. The additional protection of individual rights as presented in
the amendments written by the Massachusetts convention influenced the rest of the state
ratifying debates to follow, as it provided something new to consider in the debate over the
Constitution on both sides of the aisle.
Chapter Three focuses on the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Held after the
Massachusetts Convention, Virginia was among those states influenced by Massachusetts’
decision to recommend amendments in their ratification of the Constitution. The Virginia
convention was filled with many well-known names across the country, including Patrick Henry
and James Madison, making this convention very closely watched and very important to the final
adoption of the Constitution in the United States. This debate was much more in depth than
Massachusetts, as the Virginia delegates addressed a much wider array of problems than the
Massachusetts delegates did. The delegates to the Virginia convention hadn’t faced nearly the
political resistance to the Articles in the same way that Massachusetts did, and much of this can
be blamed on the nature of industrialization and the economies of the two states. Virginia was
more rural. Their main desires from government was that it would leave them alone to do their
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farming, own their slaves and do whatever else they felt like doing. Massachusetts was much
more industrialized and was more concerned about bigger questions of government, such as who
controls the economy and who regulates treaties and trade and commerce. That being said, there
were many more Anti-Federalists present at the Virginia convention than the Massachusetts,
resulting in a much more robust debate with many different understandings of the Constitution
that weren’t seen in Massachusetts, though most of these different understandings were not
directly relevant to this research question and spoke more to the nature of the human condition as
it was known in Virginia. In terms of principle sovereignty, there were strong arguments made in
favor of both the people and the state legislatures being principle, and the convention could not
agree on this question. There was hardly any agreement whatsoever in the Virginia convention.
Derived sovereignty seemed to have taken up the majority of the debate, with the delegates
scrutinizing every line of the Constitution. The Anti-Federalists to this convention hated the idea
of having any general government at all, so they resented any of its powers as well. Patrick
Henry, in particular, found an issue with almost every single line of derived sovereignty as
written into the Constitution. They were worried that this strong, energized general government
would have the power to control their farms, crops, and worse: slaves. They simply wanted to be
left alone, and they knew that if the general government was awarded the powers which are
written into the Constitution, they would be stripped of everything they understood to be their
personal freedoms on the farm, because the general government would begin to collect taxes and
not count slaves in representation and undermine the ability of the south to thrive.
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Chapter Two:
The Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (1787-1788)

While conventional wisdom identifies the New York and Virginia Ratifying Conventions
as the two keys to ratification of the Constitution, Massachusetts proves to be of critical
importance as well. According to Pauline Maier (2011, 155), “If Massachusetts refused to ratify,
other states---particularly New Hampshire and New York---would probably follow her
example…if, however, Massachusetts ratified, the Constitution would be well on its way toward
enactment.” The importance of Massachusetts for the prospects of ratification takes on greater
significance when one considers the very real possibility that Massachusetts would not ratify the
Constitution. With the divide between the delegates for and against the Constitution roughly
equal, ratification was not a foregone conclusion as it was in Pennsylvania. Aware of their
precarious position, proponents of the proposed Constitution had to work behind the scenes to
make allies and reach compromises in order to ensure ratification. On this challenge, Maier
(2011, 158) observes that the Massachusetts proponents of ratification, “faced a far greater
challenge than their counterparts in Pennsylvania, who had a solid majority from the start of their
convention. Massachusetts was a whole new game.” Thus, in addition to persuading fellow
delegates via reasoned discourse, proponents also had to rely on political machinations and
identify areas of compromise in an effort to turn opponents of ratification into proponents.
Arguably the most importance compromise of the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention
was the introduction of amendments that would be recommended for consideration after
ratification itself. In response to this suggestion, a number of delegates who were previously
opposed to ratification changed their position and ultimately voted to ratify. For these delegates,
the proposed amendments alleviated concerns that the grant of power to the national government
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under the Constitution threatened the security of the rights and liberties of the people. Though
many proponents did not think that amendments were necessary, they embraced the idea and
worked on getting John Hancock on board with the idea in order to ensure ratification. Hancock,
the president of the Convention, was a necessary person to the ratification process. Had he not
supported the ratification or amendments; it is possible that the Constitution would not have
passed in Massachusetts. On the importance of Hancock, Maier (2011, 194) writes: “…the
Federalists had to get Hancock on board…in a eulogy written after Hancock’s death, James
Sullivan claimed that Hancock had reservations about the Constitution and, before the state
ratifying convention had even assembled, drafted a set of amendments he planned to propose.”
As demonstrated below, Hancock is an example of a delegate whose vote was swayed with the
introduction of amendments to the Constitution, leading to the ultimate ratification of the
Constitution in Massachusetts. A key to understanding Hancock’s change and the change of
others is the distinction between principle and derived sovereignty identified by Mogg (2006)
and tested here.
This chapter will assess the delegate’s positions of principle and derived sovereignty as
seen through their participation in the Massachusetts ratifying convention. First, it will address
principle sovereignty as many delegates took different positions on who should hold the power
of the principle and to what extent. From here it will discuss the three different understandings of
principle sovereignty, that it should rest with the people, that it should rest with the particular
states, or the state governments. Following this analysis, the focus will shift to derived
sovereignty and the different understandings thereof. These include understandings of strong and
weak derived sovereignty, as well as a third option which came to fruition through the
Massachusetts convention: that the grant of power is necessary but not adequately checked
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through the language of the Constitution, or what we are calling the ‘middle’ position. To
combat this third idea, the delegates draft a set of amendments which they understand to better
protect the people’s individual rights and liberties, therefore making them okay with the grant of
derived sovereignty awarded to the general government in the Constitution. The amendments
were able to make enough delegates feel secure with the grant of power and the Constitution in
general, and many people changed their votes to be in favor of ratification with the addition of
these amendments, securing the vote to ratify at the conclusion of the convention.
Principle Sovereignty in the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention of 1788
Principle sovereignty can be viewed as authorization where the is the principle sovereign
authorizes the general government (its agent) to hold certain powers and use them to secure the
ends of government. The principle decides what powers its agent is given and determines the
extent to which these powers may be exercised. It is the responsibility of the agent, who
possesses derived sovereignty, to exercise these powers as instructed. Mogg’s (2006) analysis
finds that principle sovereignty is operationalized in two ways at the Constitutional Convention
of 1787. First, some delegates operationalize principle sovereignty at the national level and
locate it in the hands of the American people. Another group of delegates, second, is also
committed to the idea of popular sovereignty, but this group operationalizes principle
sovereignty at the state level and places it in the hands of the people of the thirteen states.
In the analysis presented in this section, evidence is presented that supports Mogg’s
(2006) conclusion that principle sovereignty is operationalized in two, distinct ways. Of the
thirty-six classifiable delegates in the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention, a strong majority
(n=24) take the position that principle sovereignty resides with the American people. Three
delegates believe that the Constitution is founded on the principle of popular sovereignty but

- 16 -

locate principle sovereignty with the people of the thirteen states. Unlike Mogg, this study
identifies six delegates who hold the position that the state governments possess principle
sovereignty. These delegates hold the position that a confederation of states is preferable to the
union proposed by the US Constitution. 1
Principle Sovereignty with the American People
Delegates committed to popular sovereignty and who locate principle sovereignty with
the American people can be viewed as strong nationalists. For these delegates, the Constitution
rejects the confederate structure of the Articles of Confederation and replaces it with a union
form of government. Where the Continental Congress was the creation of thirteen sovereign
states, the government created by the Constitution would rest on the authority of the American
people. Delegates holding this position are located in the first column of Table One.
[Insert Table One Here]
An example of this understanding of principle sovereignty is seen in a speech from Mr.
T. Dawes of Boston. He says, “…as thirty thousand inhabitants will elect a representative, eight
tenths of which electors perhaps are yeomen, and holders of farms, it will be their own faults if
they are not represented by such men as will never permit the land to be injured by unnecessary
taxes” (Kaminski 2000,1289). Here, Dawes understands that it is the people who are responsible
for ensuring that they are represented by the right people. Thus, the failure of elected officials to
abstain from the property of the people rests not with members of Congress, but with the

It may be the case that the six delegates classified here as advocating for the state governments
possessing principle sovereignty may actually hold the position that the people of each state
actually possess principle sovereignty. This is what Mogg finds in her analysis. Ultimately, the
lack of any textual evidence suggesting that this is the case in the record of the Massachusetts’
Ratifying Convention precluded me from classifying these delegates as locating principle
sovereignty in the hands of the people of the thirteen states.
1

- 17 -

American people who are responsible for holding their representatives accountable. Dr. Jarvis
develops the reasoning of Mr. Dawes further when he argues “…that there is a very material
distinction in the two cases; for, however possible it may be that this controlling authority may
be abused, it by no means followed that Congress, in any situation, could strip the people of their
right to a direct representation” (Kaminski 2000, 1220). Dr. Jarvis clearly articulates the
understanding of principle sovereignty when he says that the people have a right to direct
representation. Without explicitly using the language of the principle/agent relationship, Dr.
Jarvis clearly indicates that it is the people (the principle) who authorizes the agent
(representatives) to exercise power on behalf of the people.
This understanding of the people as the principle sovereign is central to the understanding
that the government created by the Constitution is a union and not a confederacy of states. In a
union, the people are principle to the general government rather than the state governments in the
confederate model. An example of rejecting the latter in favor of the former is seen when Mr.
Bowdoin says, “But the advantages of a union of the states are not confined to mere safety from
within or without. They extend not only to the welfare of each state, but even to the interest of
each individual of the states” (Kaminski 2000, 1393). For Mr. Bowdoin, a union is preferable to
a confederacy because of the greater security it provides the nation, the individual states, and
every individual. That the general government has the capacity to act on behalf of the individual
is important and this marks a defining characteristic of a union. Under a confederate model of
government, the general government is prevented from acting on the individual as only the state
governments possess this power. Under the union model, both the general and state governments
have the ability to act on the individual. For Bowdoin, the superiority of the union model is
codified in the Preamble to the Constitution which begins with “We the People” rather than “We
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the States.” Another example of the preference for union over confederacy is provided by Mr.
Heath. He says, “Every thing depends on our union. I know that some have supposed, that,
although the union should be broken, particular states may retain their importance; but this
cannot be. The strongest-nerved state, even the right arm, if separated from the body, must
wither. If the great union be broken, our country, as a nation, perishes…” (Kaminski 2000,
1378). In this statement, Mr. Heath clearly indicates that a union is necessary if America is going
to continue as a country going forward. Implicitly recalling the troubled history of confederacies
to endure, he clearly indicates that the states must give up the authority they enjoy under the
Articles of Confederation. If they do not, he fears that the nation will perish.
Principle Sovereignty with the People of the Thirteen States
Three delegates identified with an asterisk in Table One are committed to popular
sovereignty but operationalize principle sovereignty at the state level. In other words, whereas
the nationalists operationalize principle sovereignty with the American people, these delegates
operationalize principle sovereignty with the people of the states. For these three delegates, the
relevant authorizing entity is the people of Massachusetts.
This understanding of principle sovereignty is evident, first, in Mr. Randall. He argues
“Our manners, he said, were widely different from the Southern States; their elections were not
so free and unbiased; therefore, if the states were consolidated, he thought it would introduce
manners among us which would set us at continual variance” (Kaminski 2000, 1303). Mr.
Randall is concerned that the cultural differences between the north and the south, because of
slavery, prevent the possibility of a truly national culture which he deems a necessary
requirement for national, principle sovereignty to work. While he remains a proponent of
locating principle sovereignty with the people, Mr. Randall contends that the people of the states
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would serve as a more effective principle because and do a better job of protecting the rights of
the people. In his formulation of the relationship between the people and the general (national)
government, the states function as a middle-man where the people of the states elect their
representatives in the House (directly) and Senate (indirectly). He continues:
Let us consider, sir, we are acting for the people, and for ages unborn; let us deal fairly
and above board. Every one comes here to discharge his duty to his constituents, and I
hope none will be biased by the best orators; because we are not acting for ourselves. I
think Congress ought to have power, such as is for the good of the nation… (Kaminski
2000, 1244).
Randall views the responsibility of the delegates to the MA Convention as delegates of the
people. Given the logic of the principle/agent relationship, this would make the people of
Massachusetts the principle sovereign. Randall is concerned with the diversity of America. As he
understands it, the diversity is so strong that no national sentiment is possible which can animate
the will of the American people toward the common good. His analysis of diversity indicates that
the best way to aggregate principle sovereignty is at the state level who are homogenous enough
to facilitate the idea of the people.
Capt. Dench also falls into this camp, stating, “…it had been observed, and he was not
convinced that the observation was wrong, that the grant of the powers in this section would
produce a consolidation of the states, and the moment it begins, a dissolution of the state
governments commences. If mistaken, he wished to be set right” (Kaminski 2000, 1338). Dench
thinks that the state governments are necessary for proper government, but he is not exactly clear
on how this applies to the current Constitution. Initially, Dench is understood to identify the state
governments as principle. This is arguably the result of a misunderstanding in definition of
sovereignty and application thereof. It could be argued that, although he is concerned with the
state governments, this does not mean that he views them as principle. Rather, he could simply
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understand that these bodies are necessary for government to function regardless of where
sovereignty lies, though there is no direct proof of this understanding.
Principle Sovereignty with the State Governments
To this point of the analysis, the results presented here for the Massachusetts Ratifying
convention confirm the results of Mogg (2006) as principle sovereignty has been located with the
people, but the people has been operationalized at both the national and state levels. A third
understanding of principle sovereignty is found in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention not
found in Mogg. Here, three delegates take the position that principle sovereignty resides with the
states governments. These delegates are identified in the second column of Table One. As
mentioned in a previous footnote, Mogg is able to accumulate enough textual evidence to
conclude that delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 who advocate for a confederate
form of government actually operationalize principle sovereignty with the people of each
individual state. In the absence of similar textual evidence, this study cannot draw the same
conclusion. Thus, Dr. Taylor, Judge Dana, and Mr. Nason are classified here as locating
principle sovereignty with the state governments.
Dr. Taylor says:
By the Articles of Confederation, annual elections are provided for, though we have
additional securities in a right to recall any or all of our members from Congress, and a
provision for rotation. In the proposed Constitution, there is no provision for rotation; we
have no right by it to recall our delegates. In answer to the observations, that, by
frequency of elections, good men will be excluded, I answer, if they behave well, it is
probable they will be continued; but if they behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil
(Kaminski 2000, 1185-1186)?
Dr. Taylor prefers the model of government proposed by the Articles of Confederation. This is
seen in his understanding of a requirement for annual elections in contrast to the Constitution’s
call for biennial elections to the House. This preference for the Articles and the Continental
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Congress indicates his commitment to a confederacy of states rather than the union structure
which is outlined in the Constitution. What he is failing to account for is the ability to recall
delegates who are working against the will of the people through re-election. Though he may
wish for this power to be eligible each year, the ability to recall delegates is added to the
Constitution, so long as that delegate goes against the people.
Judge Dana is also in favor of a confederate structure of government. Similarly to Dr.
Taylor, he is concerned with representation, but he thinks that the Constitution will fail should
there be anything but a confederate structure. He says:
…if the Constitution under consideration was in fact what its opposers had often called it,
a consolidation of the states, he should readily agree with that gentleman that the
representation of the people was much too small; but this was a charge brought against it
without any foundation in truth. So far from it, that it must be apparent to every one, that
the federal government springs out of, and can alone be brought into existence by, the
state governments. Demolish the latter, and there is an end of the former (Kaminski 2000,
1238).
As Judge Dana understands it, there is no general government whatsoever without state
governments. Here he identifies the state governments as the principle sovereign to the general
government and identifies that the ends of government will come with a union structure.
Mr. Nason was one of the few delegates to explicitly speak to his understanding of the
state governments as principle. He says, “We are under oath: we have sworn that Massachusetts
is a sovereign and independent state. How, then, can we vote for this Constitution, that destroys
that sovereignty” (Kaminski 2000, 1397)? Mr. Nason is concerned that the general government
will undermine the states’ power. He is a proponent of states as principle because he, and other
delegates with the same understanding, do not think that the people have the ability to maintain
the ends of government, but rather that with this shift in principle government will be destroyed.
The understanding of the states as principle exemplifies a confederate structure of government.
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Derived Sovereignty in the Massachusetts’ Ratifying Convention of 1788
Derived sovereignty refers to the powers of the general government as authorized by the
principle. This dimension outlines the powers which the general government holds as well as the
extent of these powers. This topic, as seen in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, is widely
contested and debated. Following Mogg (2006), it is possible to operationalize derived
sovereignty as strong and weak with the former understood in terms of the grant of power
provided by the Constitution to the general government as adequate for achieving the ends of
government. The latter position maintains that the extent of derived sovereignty granted to the
general government by the Constitution is too extensive and will ultimately undermine the ends
of government. Given that the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention proposed amendments to the
Constitution, it is necessary here provide a third category for principle sovereignty. This middle
position holds that while the grant of derived sovereignty is adequate to achieve the ends of
government, the Constitution does not adequately protect the rights and liberties of the people.
Thus, further safeguards are necessary. The results for derived sovereignty are summarized in
Table Two.
[Insert Table Two Here]
Strong
Delegates who believe in a strong derived sovereign are in favor of the general
government holding more power. These delegates make up the majority of the delegates coded
here (n=22). Based on the results of the previous section, these delegates also understand that the
American people are the principle sovereign. Of the twenty-two delegates classified as holding
the strong derived sovereignty position, only Mr. Phillips does not view the American people as
principle sovereign, and this is because he cannot be classified on this dimension of sovereignty.
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The strong understanding of principle sovereignty thinks that it is necessary for the general
government to have more power in order to better secure the ends of government. These
delegates also have faith in the capacity of the American people to check the derived sovereignty
exercised by elected officials. On the relationship between the people as principle sovereign and
derived sovereignty, Mr. Gore of Boston says:
Some gentlemen suppose it is unsafe and unnecessary to vest the proposed government
with authority to "lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises. Let us strip the
subject of every thing that is foreign, and refrain from likening it with governments,
which, in their nature and administration, have no affinity; and we shall soon see that it is
not only safe, but indispensably necessary to our peace and dignity, to vest the Congress
with the powers described in this section (Kaminski 2000, 1300).
Mr. Gore understands the necessity of the general government to hold extensive power so that
they have the ability to protect the people. This is the main argument in favor of strong derived
sovereignty: the general government needs to hold enough power to protect the will of the people
effectively. If they do not have the necessary grant of power, as Mr. Gore and other delegates
understand, the government will fail. This is a huge concern among delegates, and they all take
different views on how to best address the potential abuse of power. General Brooks says,
“…when that power is given, with proper checks, the danger is at an end. When men are
answerable, and within the reach of responsibility, they cannot forget that their political
existence depends upon their good behavior” (Kaminski 2000, 1255). Representatives to the
general government will not abuse their power, according to Gen. Brooks, because the people
who elected them have the authority to remove them from office if they do. Ultimately, it is the
fear of being removed from office that prevents the abuse of derived sovereignty.
Weak
The eight delegates classified as holding the position of weak derived sovereignty believe
that the general government should have limited power. These delegates view the grant of power
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to the general government proposed by the Constitution as a threat to the rights and liberties of
the American people. Mr. Nason illustrates this belief in his praise of liberty. He says, “I beg the
indulgence of this honorable body to permit me to make a short apostrophe to Liberty. O
Liberty! thou greatest good! thou fairest property! with thee I wish to live — with thee I wish to
die! Pardon me if I drop a tear on the peril to which she is exposed; I cannot, sir, see this
brightest of jewels tarnished…” (Kaminski 2000, 1397). Mr. Nason fears the loss of liberty will
be a direct consequence of ratification. In the name of protecting liberty, Mr. Nason favors
limiting the general government more than is provided by the Constitution. Similarly, Mr.
Widgery worries that the power of taxation may be used to undermine the democratic foundation
of America. He warns that the power to tax may be employed to restrict or possibly undermine
totally the right to vote: “If Congress…have this power of taxing directly, it will be in their
power to enact a poll tax. Can gentlemen tell why they will not attempt it, and by this method
make the poor pay as much as the rich” (Kaminski 2000, 1251)? Mr. Widgery foresees a future
where America transforms from a democracy into an aristocracy. This would remove the
distinction between the United States and England and effectively undermine the American
Revolution and its legacy. This is a major concern for Widgery as well as several other delegates
to the convention.
Middle
To this point, the results of the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention support the
conclusions of Mogg (2006). The fact that amendments were recommended by the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention suggests a third understanding of derived sovereignty.
Accordingly, the five delegates who fall into this middle category view the grant of power to the
general government as necessary to the function of the general government. However, they also
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believe that the Constitution does not adequately safeguard the rights and liberties of the
American people. In an effort to win these delegates over and ensure ratification, amendments
were proposed as an addition to the Constitution. On the need for amendments and greater
security, Mr. Turner says, “…for by small degrees has liberty, in all nations, been wrested from
the hands of the people. I know great powers are necessary to be given to Congress, but I wish
they may be well guarded” (Kaminski 2000, 1226). Mr. Turner understands that there is a
necessity for enough power to the derived to protect the people, but he does not think that there
are proper checks on this power. Mr. Barrell adds the following:
Congress will be vested with more extensive powers than ever Great Britain exercised
over us; too great, in my opinion, to intrust with any class of men…while we consider
them as men of like passions, the same spontaneous, inherent thirst for power with
ourselves, great and good as they may be, when they enter upon this all-important charge,
what security can we have that they will continue so (Kaminski 2000, 1448)?
Mr. Barrell is concerned that the general government will abuse their power should they be
awarded too much of it. He is worried that this could undermine the liberties of the people but
also that they simply cannot be trusted with such a broad authorization of power. In his
understanding, political figures will inevitably abuse the power they were given as a result of
holding the position. This shows his need for further protections from the general government
which were not highlighted in the Constitution as it stood.
The introduction of amendments to the Constitution swayed the votes of many delegates
who were stuck in the middle in terms of derived sovereignty. John Hancock, President of the
Convention says, “…if amended (as I feel assured it will be) according to your proposals, cannot
fail to give the people of the United States a greater degree of political freedom, and eventually
as much national dignity, as falls to the lot of any nation on earth” (Kaminski 2000, 1475).
Hancock was on the fence about the Constitution before amendments were added. This act
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swayed his vote in favor of the Constitution, and since he was the president of the convention, it
is possible that many other delegates followed suit. Had amendments not been added to the
Constitution, it is likely that the Constitution would not have been ratified in the state of
Massachusetts.
Another example of a vote which was swayed with the introduction of amendments is
seen with Mr. Randall. He says, “…I think it becomes us, as wise men, as the faithful guardians
of the people's rights, and as we wish well to posterity, to propose such amendments as will
secure to us and ours that liberty without which life is a burden” (Kaminski 2000, 1449).
Initially, Randall was against the Constitution as he felt it provided too much derived power to
the general government. However, with the introduction of amendments, he became more
comfortable with the further protections of individual rights and freedoms of the people. With
this addition, he is willing to vote in favor of the ratification of the Constitution.
Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter confirm those found in Mogg. At the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, evidence points to the presence of a multi-dimensional understanding of
sovereignty. The first dimension, principle sovereignty, focuses on the question of who
authorizes the existence of government. Mogg finds that there are two formulations of principle
sovereignty at the Convention of 1787 with the first locating principle sovereignty in the
American people and the second locating it with the people of the states. The second dimension,
derived sovereignty, focuses on the extend of the powers authorized by the principle sovereign.
Here, the focus is on the nature and extent of the grant of power provided to the general
government by the Constitution.
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Unlike Mogg, evidence from the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention suggests the
presence of another principle sovereign, the state governments. While Mogg is able to show that
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 ultimately believe that the people of the states
are the principle sovereign, there is no evidence that allows the delegates to the Massachusetts
Convention advocating for confederacy can be classified similarly. Additionally, analysis of the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention suggest that derived sovereignty can be viewed beyond the
strong/weak distinction employed by Mogg. For some delegates, the grant of power to the
general government is adequate, but the safeguards protecting the rights and liberties of the
American people are inadequate. Thus, amendments are recommended by the Massachusetts
Ratifying Convention which has the effect of securing Massachusetts’ vote for ratification.
While these conclusions both confirm and extend Mogg’s analysis, one should view the
results presented here with caution for two reasons. First, the analysis presented here is based on
a very small sample size of thirty-six classifiable delegates. 355 delegates were in attendance at
the Massachusetts Convention. Of those 355, 66 spoke. Of those 66, 33 were classifiable. Thus,
it cannot be concluded that the thirty-six delegates focused on here are representative of
Massachusetts more generally. Second, the Massachusetts’ Convention is limited in focus. There
is hardly any discussion the executive branch, the judicial branch, and many other relevant
aspects of the Constitution.
The Virginia Convention, conversely, features a much smaller amount of delegates in
attendance as well as a much wider spread of discussion of issues. The Virginia Convention
addressed almost every clause of the Constitution, and the delegates scrutinized the document,
seemingly, much more than the delegates to the Massachusetts convention. Though the Virginia
delegates debated much more in depth than those of Massachusetts, generally the delegates from
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both conventions had the same understandings about what principle and derived sovereignty
should look like.
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Table One: Delegate Positions on Principle Sovereignty at the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
People
(n= 27)

States
(n= 3)

Non-Classifiable
(n= 6)

Mr. Sedgwick

Mr. Widgery*

Dr. Taylor

Mr. Phillips

Dr. Jarvis

Capt. Dench*

Judge Dana

Mr. Davis

Mr. Dalton

Mr. Randall*

Mr. Nason

Mr. Bodman

Mr. Gorham

Mr. White

Mr. Parsons

Mr. Barrell

Mr. King

Mr. Singletary

Mr. Gore
Mr. Dawes
Mr. Bowdoin
His Ex. Hancock
Mr. Adams
Mr. Jones
Rev. Stillman
Mr. Heath
Capt. Snow
Judge Sumner
Rev. Thacher
Mr. Ames
Mr. Cabot
Mr. West
Mr. Turner
Gen. Brooks
Mr. Symmes
Mr. Choate
*Delegates with an asterisk operationalize principles sovereignty at the state level
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Table Two: Delegate Positions on Derived Sovereignty at the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention
Strong
(n= 22)
Mr. Sedgwick

Middle
(n= 5)
His Ex. John Hancock

Weak
(n= 8)
Mr. Widgery

Dr. Jarvis

Mr. Barrell

Dr. Taylor

Mr. Dalton

Mr. Turner

Capt. Dench

Mr. Gorham

Mr. Cabot

Mr. Randall

Mr. Parsons

Judge Dana

Mr. Bodman

Mr. King

Mr. White

Mr. Dawes

Mr. Nason

Mr. Bowdoin

Mr. Singletary

Non-Classifiable
(n= 1)
Mr. Davis

Mr. Phillips
Mr. Adams
Mr. Jones
Rev. Stillman
Mr. Heath
Mr. Gore
Judge Sumner
Rev. Thacher
Mr. Ames
Mr. Choate
Mr. Symmes
Gen. Brooks
Mr. West
Capt. Snow
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Chapter Three:
The Virginia Ratifying Convention (1788)

The debate in the Virginia Ratifying Convention promised to be one of great weight both
within their state lines and to the future prospects for ratification of the Constitution. Pauline
Maier (2011, 257) refers to this convention as a “battle of giants,” speaking to the extensive list
of prominent delegates who were scheduled to attend.2 To add to the pressure of the debate,
Maier (2011, 256) writes, “The convention promised to be a contest of epic proportions. The
sides were almost equally strong…” The opposition in this debate, which includes delegates such
as Patrick Henry and George Mason, were wildly popular in Virginia, giving them an important
advantage over proponents of the Constitution. Fortunately, The Federalist helped the supporters
in this uphill battle (Maier 2011, 256-257). This strategic move by James Madison, John Jay, and
Alexander Hamilton, both to publish the papers publicly as well as flush copies into Virginia
before the debates began, affected the nature of the debate as well as public opinion in favor of
ratification. Maier (2011, 257) writes, “By June, several Virginians owned the first volume, of
which Hamilton, on Madison’s request, had sent fifty-two copies to Edmund Randolph in May.”
Randolph was the Governor of Virginia at the time as well as a prominent delegate to the
Virginia ratifying convention. Though many other delegates claimed to have never seen any of
the Federalist Papers, it was clear that Madison and Hamilton were trying to mobilize their side
through the governor and the public, since the essays were also published in the Norfolk and
Portsmouth Journal which was accessible to all, including the delegates (Maier 2011. 257).

“Giants” consisted of delegates including James Madison, Patrick Henry, Gov. Edmund
Randolph, John Marshall, and George Nicholas.
2
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The influence on the debate by both the status of its delegates and the publication of The
Federalist caused both sides to be very active in the discussion, though sometimes to a fault. The
biggest fault in this convention was the consistent influx of arguments from Patrick Henry. Maier
(2011, 257) writes, “For better or worse, he [Patrick Henry] forced it to confront big questions
that were not on its formal agenda and that had not been explored, certainly not with equal
rhetorical flare, in any previous ratifying convention.” Despite the efforts of delegates to debate
the Constitution clause-by-clause, this structure slowly dissolved. Patrick Henry managed to
hijack the debate in order to ask these important, often overlooked, questions. But in doing this
he simultaneously destroyed the structure, and consequently the nature of the debate because
delegates were spending more time responding to his long list of objections rather than debating
the language of the document in question (Maier 2011, 267). Tackling Henry’s arguments was
no easy task. Maier (2011, 272) writes, “He also had a way, as Henry Lee complained, of
throwing out ‘bolts’ in a ‘desultory’ or random way, one after another and in great profusion,
which made him hard to answer in a systematic way. That explains why the responses to Henry
were often also ‘desultory’ as well as long and repetitive.” Henry’s impact on the debate was
substantial, and it derailed much of the organization that was implemented at the start as well as
altering the nature of the debate itself. With regard to the former, Henry adversely affected both
sides of the debate. Maier (2011, 267) speaks to Henry’s extensive speeches and their effect on
the convention when she writes, “Many delegates, however, were moved mainly to exasperation.
‘If we go on in this irregular manner, contrary to our resolution,’ Randolph complained, ‘instead
of three or six weeks, it. Will take us six months to decide this question.’” Every delegate was
starting to get tired of Henry’s constant lengthy interjections, because it distracted them all from
the point of the convention. James Madison was typically the delegate to rebut the remarks of
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Mr. Henry, but his remarks were causing Madison to worry about the fate of the Constitution
(Maier; 2011, 279). He was worried that Henry’s arguments and, to Madison, interruptions
would confuse other delegates and persuade them into voting against ratification.
Luckily for Madison and other Federalists, the Constitution was ratified. And, similarly
to Massachusetts, the delegates to the Virginia convention who opposed this decision called for
amendments to be included in its recommendation. Maier (2011, 307) writes, “The bill of rights,
which the convention approved without dissent, was a revised version of the 1776 Virginia
declaration of rights, including its affirmation of the right of trial by jury but without its opening
statement ‘that all men are by nature equal’ and have ‘certain inherent rights.’” However, though
ratification had been voted for and amendments had been written, the Constitution was still
facing an uphill battle. Maier (2011, 317) continues, “The Constitution had been ratified, but the
ratification controversy was not over. The battle lines had, however, been redefined. The next
fight would be over the future of those amendments that, it seemed, a substantial part of ‘We the
People’ wanted” (2011, 317). Those opposed to the Constitution were persistent in their pursuit
to add amendments to the document and would not settle for less.
This chapter will analyze the speech of each delegate to the Virginia state ratifying
convention in order to classify delegates on their understandings of principle and derived
sovereignty. Beginning with principle sovereignty, this chapter assesses the arguments of those
delegates who speak to this dimension, regardless of who or what they understand should hold
principle sovereignty. Repeating the process used in the Massachusetts analysis, I created
vignettes for each delegate with an eye to classifying their understandings of principle and
derived sovereignty. The results presented here are consistent with Mogg’s (2006) findings that
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 found a single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty.
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The results presented in this chapter also indicate that the delegates to the Virginia Convention
operationalize principle and derived sovereignty in the same ways that delegates to the
Massachusetts Convention operationalized these concepts. The only exception to this is that the
Virginia Convention did not show any evidence of a ‘middle’ understanding of derived
sovereignty, meaning that the introduction of amendments was unable to sway any votes to favor
ratification in Virginia. To this end, it can be understood that the two conventions were
representative of widely understood conclusions of the Constitution, and therefore were also
representative of the understandings of the people. Virginia also touched on a lot more issues
than the Massachusetts convention did, showing the limitations of the Massachussetts debate.
The results of the Virginia analysis are presented in the next two sections.
Principle Sovereignty in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788
Consistent with the understanding of principle sovereignty provided in this analysis of the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, the Virginia Ratifying Convention also exhibits an
understanding among delegates of the people as principle sovereign, while also operationalizing
principle sovereignty in the people of the state as well as with the state governments. Virginia
had a much smaller number of delegates compared to the Massachusetts Convention, and they
had a much closer competition between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. Given this close
debate, the Virginia delegates struggled with coming to an agreement about who should be
principle sovereign. This decision is made more difficult with the prevalence of three different
understandings of where principle sovereignty should be held. With the deathly combination of a
divided Anti-Federalist party (some Anti-Federalists operationalized principle sovereignty with
the American people while at least one operationalized it with the people of the state) and a
much smaller amount of delegates present as opposed to the Massachusetts Convention,
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Virginia’s Convention promised to be an interesting and important decision. The Anti-Federalists
needed to unite their understandings in order to defeat James Madison and his cohorts in favor of
“We the People,” and the Federalists had to work to convince several opposers of their
opponents that the Constitution was a good idea. Both parties faced a difficult battle, showing the
true gravity of this “battle of giants.”
Despite these factors, this analysis supports the findings of Mogg (2006) that the
Constitution is grounded on a single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty. It also is consistent
with the results presented in the previous chapter for the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention.
However, there is one noticeable difference between the two Conventions looked at in this study.
Unlike the Massachusetts Convention, where delegates located principle sovereignty in the
people at the state or national levels, in the Virginia Convention a minority of delegates locate
principle sovereignty with the state governments. Locating principle sovereignty in the state
governments also distinguishes a key argument presented in the Virginia Convention from the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 where this argument was not made.
Principle Sovereignty with the American People
The first understanding of principle sovereignty is that the authorizing agent to
government should be the American people. Delegates holding this position are located in the
first column of Table 1 with the exception of George Mason who locates principle sovereignty
with the people at the state level. This is consistent with the understanding provided in the
Massachusetts convention where the majority also held that the American people should be the
principle sovereign to government.
[Inset Table 1 Here]
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Mr. Pendleton spoke to principle sovereignty residing with the American people at the
Virginia Convention saying, “We, the people, is thought improper. Permit me to ask the
gentleman who made this objection, who but the people can delegate powers? Who but the
people have a right to form government” (Elliot 1974, 37)? Mr. Pendleton said that “we, the
people,” was the proper way to begin the Constitution because it gave the people the authority
that they deserved as the principle to government. Mr. Corbin agrees with him about the
objections to “We the people,” saying, “I expected no such objection as this. Ought not the
people, sir, to judge of that government whereby they are to be ruled” (Elliot 1974, 105)? Both
delegates understand that “We the people” is the best opening statement for the Constitution
because they believe in a government of consent.
Governor Randolph concurs with Mr. Pendleton and Mr. Corbin, saying, “If the
government is to be binding on the people, are not the people the proper persons to examine its
merits or defects” (Elliot 1974, 29)? Randolph expresses his understanding of the people as
principle because he says the people should be able to fully consent to the government which
controls them. He strongly believes that the people are at the center of government, and he likes
the Constitution because it highlights and promotes that idea much more than the Articles of
Confederation. To this end, he agrees that the people should be principle because the
Constitution rules over the people as a whole, and he is in favor of that. Governor Randolph also
says, “The government is for the people; and the misfortune was, that the people had no agency
in the government before” (Elliot 1974, 28). Here, Governor Randolph is talking about the
Articles of Confederation and their role of the state governments as principle. He says that this is
incorrect, and that this position should be given to the people. He comes to this conclusion
because he finds that the Articles was abusive to the rights of the people, and it was insufficient
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in protecting their rights. The states as principle sovereign has an inherent tension with free or
republican government, because it eliminates the people from having a direct say in their
government and making decisions about the laws which govern them. To Gov. Randolph, as well
as several other delegates, the people serving this purpose is absolutely necessary to having a
free, energetic, republican government.
The strongest proponent of the Constitution and therefore vesting the people with the
powers of the principle was arguably James Madison. Though much of his time in the
Convention was spent discrediting the speeches of Patrick Henry, he also was able to form a very
strong argument in favor of ratification. Madison says, “It is almost certain, therefore, that the
deliberations of the members of the federal House of Representatives will be directed to the
interest of the people of America” (Elliot 1974, 97). Madison has to try to convince the opposers
to ratification that this Constitution is a good idea for the country. To do this, he emphasizes the
role of the people as principle in the House of Representatives, directly, and to other offices
indirectly. Those delegates against the Constitution disliked this, and instead wanted the state
governments to retain more power than the Constitution allows for. Madison argues against this
in saying that a confederation is insufficient as proven by history, saying:
If we recur to history, and review the annals of mankind. I undertake to say that no
instance can be produced, by the most learned man, of any confederate government that
will justify a continuation of the present system, or that will not demonstrate the necessity
of this change, and of substituting, for the present pernicious and fatal plan, the system
now under consideration, or one equally energetic (Elliot 1974, 129).
Madison expresses his understanding of a union structure of government which, as described in
the Massachusetts analysis previously provided, coincides with the understanding of the people
as principle. Mr. John Marshall joins Madison in this argument, saying, “The state governments
did not derive their powers from the general government; but each government derived its
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powers from the people, and each was to act according to the powers given it” (Elliot 1974, 419).
Mr. Marshall also argues against the previous decision held in the Articles that the state
governments should be principle. This shows his commitment to both the people as principle as
well as to the union in the same way as Madison.
The only delegate to the Virginia convention who operationalized principle sovereignty
with the people of the state was Mr. George Mason. Mr. Mason is the only delegate to speak to
this understanding, but it is entirely possible that he was not the only delegate to hold this
position, and that some others likely agreed with him but never spoke to their understanding at
the convention. He also had a hybrid understanding of what the government should look like, but
a different sort of hybrid than the one presented by Mr. Grayson. Mr. Mason is in favor of the
union, saying, “These two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will destroy the
other: the general government being paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the
state governments, the latter must give way to the former” (Elliot 1974, 29-30). But he thinks
that the grant of derived sovereignty in the general government is too extreme. To combat this,
he proposes a government which vests the powers of the principle with the people of the state.
He says, “I solemnly declare that no man is a greater friend to a firm union of the American
states than I am; but, sir, if this great end can be obtained without hazarding the rights of the
people, why should we recur to such dangerous principles” (Elliot 1974, 30)? The understanding
that Mr. Mason believes that the people of the state should be principle sovereign is established
here. He calls for “a firm union of the American states” This means that. the understands that
each state should have a say in government, but since he says the ‘American’ states it can be
assumed that he likes the idea of the union and therefore the general government (as this is what
‘America’ consists of). If he were in favor of the state governments as principle then he would
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not admit to this union, and if he wanted the people as principle then he would have said so
explicitly.
Mr. Mason is classified as being in favor of a union which has weak derived sovereignty.
This is further proven when he says:
If we give the general government the power of demanding their quotas of the states, with
an alternative of laying direct taxes in case of non-compliance, then the mischief would
be avoided; and the certainty of this conditional power would, in all human probability,
prevent the application, and the sums necessary for the Union would be then laid by the
states, by those who know how it can best be raised, by those who have a fellow-feeling
for us (Elliot 1974, 31).
Mr. Mason sympathizes with the position of the state, and he tries to form a hybrid principle
sovereign which combines a union and confederacy. This makes him feel more secure with the
grant of power to the general government, as some will be retained back to the states, and it
protects the will of the people, as Mr. Mason understands it. This is his solution to the
Constitution, but he is the only one to think about it, besides Mr. Grayson, in a more abstract
way. Those two are the only ones who did not really adhere to any specific understanding of
what government should look like based on the two examples they had in front of them, but they
took a more out-of-the-box approach to addressing the problem at hand. This combination of a
union and a confederacy is also grounds for understanding Mr. Mason as placing principle
sovereignty with the people of the state, because that would by the hybrid principle position
given his desire to also combine a union and a confederacy. This, along with his speech as
previously mentioned where he spoke to “a firm union of the American states,” are sufficient to
classify Mr. Mason as operationalizing principle sovereignty with the people of the states.
Principle Sovereignty with the State Governments
There were many delegates who were strongly against the Constitution, and who spoke
frequently and eloquently about their support for the Articles of Confederation. The change from
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the Articles to the Constitution was far too drastic, not to mention illegal, for them to be
comfortable jumping on board with such an idea. Despite their fears of abuse in this new
government, many other delegates disagreed with them, showing that the delegates opposed to
the Constitution had to work just as hard as their opposition to win votes to reject ratification
because the convention was so evenly split between those in favor and those against the
contested document. To achieve this, delegates such as Patrick Henry and Mr. Grayson spoke
adamantly against the union and the people as principle. They favored the principle sovereignty
which is outlined in the Articles: the state governments. These delegates are identified in the
second column of Table 1.
Mr. Henry is arguably the most outspoken delegate against the Constitution throughout
the convention. He says, “Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people, instead
of, We, the states? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the states be
not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government, of the
people of all the states” (Elliot 1974, 22). He clearly prefers the state governments as principle
over the people, as he directly rejects the use of “we the people” for the Constitution. Mr.
Monroe agrees with him, saying, “What is the form of our state governments? They are all
similar in their structure -- perfectly democratic. The freedom of mankind has found an asylum
here which it could find nowhere else. Freedom of conscience is enjoyed here in the fullest
degree” (Elliot 1974, 211). Mr. Monroe agrees with Henry’s sentiments that the union is abusive,
and the confederation should remain in-tact with the state governments as principle sovereign.
He understands the state governments to be ‘perfectly democratic’, so it makes sense that he
would agree with Henry that they should be the principle sovereign to government. To this end,
both Henry and Monroe reject the union because the union eliminates the role of the state
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governments as principle and gives it to the people instead. Mr. Henry continues, “It will destroy
the state governments, and swallow the liberties of the people, without giving previous notice”
(Elliot 1974, 156). Henry connects liberty with a confederacy, and he thinks the enactment of
union and a shift to the people as principle will completely destroy this notion and eliminate the
liberty of the people.3 This shows his clear support to uphold the Articles of Confederation and
maintain the confederacy and state governments as principle. He continues, “Notwithstanding
two of their provinces have paid nothing, yet I hope the example of Holland will tell us that we
can live happily without changing our present despised government Cannot people be as happy
under a mild as under an energetic government” (Elliot 1974, 160-161). He thinks that the call
for a new energetic government is unreasonable and uncalled for. Mr. Henry thinks that these
things are already founded in the Confederacy. Mr. Monroe also agreed that the confederacy was
the best structure for government, saying, “...if we consider our comparative situation, we shall
find that nothing can be adduced, from any of them, to warrant a departure from a confederacy to
a consolidation, on the principle of inefficacy in the former to secure our happiness” (Elliot
1974, 211). Monroe agrees with Henry that the confederation of the states is the only way to
secure the happiness of the people, and also to protect them from an abusive government.

Henry upheld the position of the Anti-Federalist, which argued that the grant of power in the
Constitution was far too extensive, and that instead the Articles should simply be amended. He
liked the idea of the states being the center of government and holding the powers of government
thereof. Madison, conversely, thought that the Constitution was a necessary shift in government
as the Articles’ government is too limited. He calls for a more energetic and involved general
government with more power to protect the will of the people. The largest shift from the Articles
to the Constitution was the idea that the people should be in charge of government and that the
general government should hold more power than the Articles allowed for. Outside of that, both
sides were concerned with protecting the will of the people, they just had different means to
achieve those ends.
3
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Henry’s main partner in his pursuit to reject the Constitution was Mr. Grayson, with
minor assistance from Mr. Monroe. Mr. Grayson also agreed that the state governments should
be principle sovereign. He says, “But have the people the power of making honest men be
elected? If he be an honest man, and his wages so low that he could not pay for his expenses, he
could not serve them if elected. But there are many thirsting after offices more than public good”
(Elliot 1974, 375). This shows his problem with the people as principle: he doesn’t believe that
the people have the proper knowledge or understanding of the government to be able to choose
its representatives. He continues, “There are two sets always in that house -- one, the landed
interest, the most patriotic and respectable; the other, a set of dependents and fortune hunters,
who are elected for their own particular interest, and are willing to sell the interest of their
constituents to the crown” (Elliot 1974, 375). He thinks that representatives elected by the people
will inevitably become corrupt and fueled by self-interest rather than the public good.
Mr. Grayson agrees that the state governments should be principle sovereign, but he
disagrees with the typical anti-Constitution position because he did not necessarily want to reject
the union or the confederation. He says, “I do not pretend to say that the present Confederation is
not defective. Its defects have been actually experienced. But I am afraid that they cannot be
removed” (Elliot 1974, 273). He recognizes that the confederation has problems, but he does not
think that it should be abolished, or that a union should be instated, but rather that the
Continental Congress should have done the job they were supposed to do, amend the Articles.
Grayson continues, “Under a supposition that mankind can govern themselves, I would
recommend that the present Confederation should be amended” (Elliot 1974, 278). Mr. Grayson
is the only delegate to the Virginia convention who does not support either the union or the
confederacy, and instead comes up with a sort of hybrid structure of government. His understood
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hybrid system varies from that of Mr. Henry because it does not comply that the state
governments should be the sole principle sovereign. Mr. Grayson likes the idea of the states as
principle, but he thinks that this alone is just as abusive as the people being sole principle. It is
difficult to classify Mr. Grayson, because he does not explicitly state who he wishes to hold the
powers of principle sovereign, but given his contradiction to the arguments on either side of the
aisle, it can be understood that he wishes to combine the efforts of a union and confederacy into
a structure that could potentially be a compromise, it seems, for all delegates. He continues,
“Give Congress the regulation of commerce. Infuse new strength and spirit into the state
governments; for, when the component parts are strong, it will give energy to the government,
although it be otherwise weak” (Elliot 1974, 278). He tries to combine a union and a confederacy
into a sort of hybrid system of government. He thinks that the states and the federal government
should work together under the larger umbrella of the general government. This is the only real
stray from the traditional understandings and connection between a confederacy with the states
as principle, and a union with the people as principle seen in Virginia.
Derived Sovereignty in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788
Derived sovereignty in the Virginia Convention differed from what we saw in the
Massachusetts Convention in one major way: the delegates to the Virginia Convention did not
introduce, in nearly the grandeur, the implementation of amendments as a way to sway votes.
The Virginia delegates did talk about amendments to the extent that the opposition to the
Constitution argued for a bill of rights, but no votes were able to be swayed with the introduction
of amendments, as was seen in Massachusetts. To this end, the Virginia delegates showed only
two modes of derived sovereignty: strong and weak. Consistent with the understandings of
derived sovereignty as defined in the Massachusetts analysis presented in the previous chapter,
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here we see a strong form of derived sovereignty where the grant of power to the general
government is both necessary and sufficient. We also find a weak formulation of derived
sovereignty where delegates view the grant of power to the general government as too extensive.
According to these delegates, such an extensive grant of power will undermine the liberties of
the people. The results for derived sovereignty are presented in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Table 2 suggests that he delegates to the Virginia Convention spoke more in favor of
strong derived sovereignty than of weak. Mr. Mason, given his alternate understanding of
principle sovereignty and operationalizing this within the people of the state, sides with the
opponents of ratification on this question and supports weak derived sovereignty. Delegates
opposed to the Constitution were much more vocal on this question of derived sovereignty than
they were on the question of principle sovereignty. Their main concern was the protection of the
liberties of the people, and they felt that given the powers granted to Congress in this document,
these liberties were now jeopardized. While the delegates to the Massachusetts Convention were
able to come to some sort of an agreement about derived sovereignty with the addition of
amendments, the Virginia Convention did not have any such compromise. However, alternately
from Massachusetts, the Virginia delegates discussed many more aspects of derived sovereignty.
They debated the entire document, whereas Massachusetts spoke to mainly only Article 1,
Section 8 for derived sovereignty.
Strong Derived Sovereignty
Mr. George Nicholas speaks to derived sovereignty and Article 1 Section 8, specifically
the provision granting Congress control over the militia. He thinks that this grant of power is
necessary to the protection of the people. He says, “The first clause gives the general government

- 45 -

power to call them out when necessary. Does this take it away from the states? No. But it gives
an additional security; for, besides the power in the state governments to use their own militia, it
will be the duty of the general government to aid them with the strength of the Union when
called for” (Elliot 1974, 427). Here, he is trying to argue that the grant of power to Congress
works in conjunction with that of the states, so the opponents of ratification do not need to worry
about both the states losing power and the abuse of the general government. Additionally, his
purpose in pointing this out is to show that the states need to work together to achieve the proper
ends of government, securing the happiness and liberties of the people. Mr. Lee of
Westmoreland connects this to the British experience and says, “If, then, the House of Commons
was so powerful, no danger can be apprehended that our House of Representatives is not amply
able to protect our liberties” (Elliot 1974, 43). He thinks that the grant of power to Congress is
necessary to protect the liberties of the people. Additionally, he compares the two governments
in order to demonstrate that the proposed Constitution and the House of Representatives will
work better than the British House of Commons because this government is actually armed with
the powers necessary to protect the people in a way that the British were not, clearly.
Mr. Johnson concurs with Mr. Lee and Mr. George Nicholas. He says, “…my judgment
is convinced of the safety and propriety of this system” (Elliot 1974, 644). Mr. Madison
advocates in favor of the derived sovereignty featured in the Constitution. In agreement with Mr.
Nicholas’ argument in favor of Congress having power over the militia, Madison says, “But the
honorable member sees great danger in the provision concerning the militia. This I conceive to
be an additional security to our liberty, without diminishing the power of the states in any
considerable degree” (Elliot 1974, 89-90). He spends most of his time responding to the rebuttals
of the opposition in this debate, but he was also able to speak to the importance of having an
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energetic and less limited government than what is provided in the Articles of Confederation
because we need to be able to be protected by something if a problem arises. The Articles were
untrustworthy in this sense, so Madison works to convince his opposition that this grant of power
is a security rather than an infringement of rights. He says, “It can be of little advantage to those
in power to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people” (Elliot 1974, 95). Here, Madison
is trying to prove to the opposition that this government is not designed to be oppressive and that
there are adequate checks written into the document that will protect the people from the
potential abuses which they are so adamantly insisting will occur.
As the debate progressed, the delegates began to speak to other articles of the
Constitution. When speaking to Article 2 and the powers of the executive, Gov. Randolph says,
“That which has produced my opinion against the limitation of his eligibility is this — that it
renders him more independent in his place, and more solicitous of promoting the interest of his
constituents; for, unless you put it in his power to be reelected, instead of being attentive to their
interests, he will lean to the augmentation of his private emoluments” (Elliot 1974, 485-486).
Gov. Randolph does not agree that the President should have limitations for eligibility. As he
sees it, this excludes many possibly great candidates, and he thinks that that serves an injustice to
the people. Though this does show him as being in tension with the language of the document,
which would imply the potential for Gov. Randolph to question his commitment to the
document, this does not undermine his commitment to strong derived sovereignty because he is
in favor of the executive holding more power. Since he wants them to have more power, it is
understood that he still believes in strong derived sovereignty. Mr. Madison talks about the role
of the state in Article 2, adding to Gov. Randolph’s speech to show why the Constitution was
written as it is. Madison says, “Difficulties would arise from the extent and population of the
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states. Instead of this, the people choose the electors” (Elliot 1974, 494). The presidential
election system is a sort of hybrid between a confederacy and a union, as Mr. Madison explains
it. The people elect their state’s electors, and those electors choose the president, though they
typically base their votes for the presidency on what the people want. Because of this, he is
hoping that the opposition will agree that this grant of power is important and necessary, as well
as sufficiently protective of the people and their liberties. Additionally, Randolph’s
understanding of what Article 2 should look like is very extreme, so Madison is also showing
that the Constitution is making efforts to best protect the people.
When addressing Article 3 and the powers of the judiciary, Mr. John Marshall speaks to
his understanding of what the judiciary should consist of. He says, “That many benefits will
result from this to the members of the collective society, every one confesses. Unless its
organization be defective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of accommodating, the
convenience of the people, it merits our approbation” (Elliot 1974, 551). He agrees with the
Article at hand, but only to the extent that he thinks that a proper judiciary is necessary, and he
thinks that this branch should accommodate the people above all else. He continues, “Gentlemen
have gone on an idea that the federal courts will not determine the causes which may come
before them with the same fairness and impartiality with which other courts decide. What are the
reasons of this supposition” (Elliot 1974, 552)? Mr. Marshall disagrees with the opposition’s
concern that the Supreme Court will be biased in their legal decisions. He thinks that they will
behave properly and with an eye to the public good. Mr. Madison echoes those words of Mr.
Marshall, agreeing that this Article is a stray from the understandings of the anti-federalists. He
says, “I acknowledge that this part does not stand in that form which would be freest from
objection” (Elliot 1974, 530). He realizes that the language on the judiciary is not exactly the
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most protective of the people because they have no say in who gets selected and elected into the
Supreme Court. He continues, “I believe the general government will do what is for the interest
of the United States; because they have no substantial reason or inducement to violate their duty,
nor are they warranted by this part of the plan to commit the oppressions he dreads” (Elliot 1974,
530). Despite knowing that there are problems with the language, he still thinks that it is a good
clause and it will work for the American people in the end. There is no point to the President
choosing a weak nominee, as it will reflect poorly on their political performance and may result
in the failure of them to be reelected, so the people would be protected through this check.
Madison speaks again to his admiration of the Constitution, but this time he is arguably
trying to speak to his understanding of Article 4 Section 4. He says, “…nothing has excited more
admiration in the world than the manner in which free governments have been established in
America; for it was the first instance, from the creation of the world to the American revolution,
that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such of
their citizens as possessed their confidence, to determine upon and give effect to it” (Elliot 1974,
616). Mr. Madison likes this article because it marries the ideas of the opposition and those in
favor of ratification in retaining other powers back to the state. It establishes an open relationship
between the states and the general government with the larger umbrella of the Constitution to
unite them together into one union. Article 4 Section 4 reads, “The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and…against domestic Violence” (IV, 4). This speaks to derived sovereignty
because this decision was not present in the Articles, making it consistent with a larger grant of
power to the general government which speaks to strong derived sovereignty. In the Articles, all
of the powers were retained to the state governments, so, given that Madison speaks in favor of
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this clause, it can be understood that he wants some derived sovereignty to be vested in the
general government, making him in favor of strong derived sovereignty.
Virginia delegates introduced problems with the Constitution that the delegates to the
Massachusetts did not discuss. The biggest example of this is the expansion of the Mississippi
River. Anti-Federalists were concerned that the general government under the Constitution
would restrict this expansion: a prospect which would allow the government far too much
derived sovereignty according to them. Madison responds in protest, saying that he does not even
want to discuss this, “…as it is foreign to the object of our deliberations here, and may, in the
opinion of some, tend to sully the reputation of our public councils. As far as my memory will
enable me, I will develop the subject. We shall not differ from one another with respect to facts:
perhaps we may differ with respect to principles” (Elliot 1974, 344). Here, Madison is trying to
show that the opposition has their facts wrong intentionally. They are trying to blame the
document for constant abuse against the people and extensive derived sovereignty. Madison is
trying to show his opposition the facts of the matter rather than solely relying on their
speculation of persistant abuse in the Constituition. Madison continues,
I stated that there was a period when the Southern States were advocates for the
alienation: or suspension, of the right to the Mississippi, (I will not say which,) and the
Eastern States were against both. I mention this to show that there was no disposition in
that part to surrender that right, or dispose of that country. I do suppose that the fishery
had its influence on those states. No doubt it was the case (Elliot 1974, 345).
Madison uses his language very carefully here to not give away too much information, it seems,
since he will reveal the truth of the understanding of the south. Here he reveals a shifting position
on the part of the Anti-Federalists. Madison is insinuating that his opposition was not even
relying on political principle to inform their decisions, but rather biased opinions about the
document in question. This has implications for derived sovereignty because it speaks to
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representation: the southern states have a much smaller population for representation than the
northern states, especially with the Constitutional addition of the 3/5 Compromise 4. Western
expansion beyond the Mississippi would ensure them more southern votes. For this reason, the
Anti-Federalists beg the question. Madison, however, resents their sentiments and tells them of
the facts of the matter. He does this in order to show them that their analysis is incorrect and that
this will not have any implications for derived sovereignty as decided within Congress, to the
extension of decisions which are made in Congress after representatives are selected. Madison
continues, “The people at large choose those who elect the President. The weight of population
will be to the southward, if we include the western country” (Elliot 1974, 347). Madison argues
that the south has just as much say in government without expansion, and so the claim of his
opponents is false because the majority of ideas rests in the south while the majority of
population rests in the north. Madison is the only delegate to really give a clear account of what
this language means, and what the nature of expansion would look like. Other delegates such as
Gov. Randolph and Mr. Corbin also speak to the issue, but provide more speculative accounts of
the matter because they do not really understand it themselves. The south was concerned with
this in terms of slavery. They did not want their rights to own slaves to be undermined by the
new document, and even worse, the refusal to allow expansion beyond the Mississippi.
This is evident when Gov. Randolph speaks to the nature of slavery in response to Patrick
Henry. He says, “I sympathized most warmly with what other gentlemen said yesterday, that, let
the contest be what it may, the minority should submit to the majority. With satisfaction and joy
I heard what he then said — that he would submit, and that there should be peace if his power

The language of the 3/5 Compromise can be found in Article 1 Section 2, point 3 of the
Constitution.
4
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could procure it” (Elliot 1974, 597). Gov. Randolph is against the idea of slavery as well as
Henry, and they also agree that the dictates of the majority should decide the nature of slavery,
and that the general government should not have the power to make this decision, even though
both he and Henry admitted to wanting to abolish it, if that power were allowed.
Weak Derived Sovereignty
Delegates critical of the grant of power provided by the Constitution are classified as
favoring weak derived sovereignty and are located in the second column of Table 2. Many
delegates to the Virginia Convention thought that the grant of power vested to Congress was far
too extensive and that this would jeopardize the rights of the people. In this convention, most
delegates were more concerned with derived sovereignty as opposed to principle, so I was better
able to classify delegates based on this understanding.
Once again, the most adamant speaker against the grant of derived sovereignty provided
by the Constitution was Patrick Henry, aided by Mr. Grayson and Mr. Mason. The grant of
power written into the Constitution was absolutely absurd to them as it opened the door for the
national government to abuse its power. That the Federalists even thought that this would be
okay with them as well as the general public only furthers the absurdity of the position taken by
the proponents of the Constitution. Mr. Henry says,
You are told there is no peace, although you fondly flatter yourselves that all is peace; no
peace; a general cry and alarm in the country; commerce, riches, and wealth, vanished;
citizens going to seek comforts in other parts or the world; laws insulted; many instances
of tyrannical legislation. These things, sir, are new to me. He has made the discovery. As
to the administration of justice, I believe that failures in commerce, &c., cannot be
attributed to it (Elliot 1974, 139).
Here, Mr. Henry is trying to show that the document at hand is deceptive to the people. Madison
and his cohort are trying to convince the public that this government is necessary to their rights
and freedoms being best protected when in reality, as Henry sees it, this is a method of
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brainwashing the public into seeing the Articles as abusive when they really are not. He does not
want to see the public manipulated into something that is unfit for them, and so he and his fellow
opposers fight adamantly against the abusive level of derived sovereignty in the Constitution.
Mr. Grayson joins Mr. Henry. More specifically, he discusses the absurdity of vesting the
power of the purse in Congress. He says, “As to direct taxation -- give up this, and you give up
every thing, as it is the highest act of sovereignty: surrender up this inestimable jewel, and you
will throw away a pearl richer than all your tribe” (Elliot 1974, 280). Mr. Grayson speaks to the
power of taxation as the most vitally important power to a government. He does not think that
the states should give up this power to the general government, and if they do then the sanctity of
protective and free government is put into question. Mr. Dawson adds to Mr. Grayson and
expresses his agreement with his sentiments. He says that it “…appears to me to be big with
unnecessary danger, and to reduce human nature, to which I would willingly pay a compliment
did not the experience of all ages rise up against me, to too great a test” (Elliot 1974, 608-609).
Mr. Dawson thinks that the grant of power in Section 8 is far too extensive and abusive to the
people. The delegates who believed in weak derived sovereignty thought that Article 1 Section 8,
in particular, was able to destroy the protection of the rights of the people. Congress having
power over both the purse and sword is tyrannical, in their understanding, and will inevitably be
used for evil rather than the “good” purpose that Madison keeps saying is the case. They were
extremely skeptical that the people alone would be able to control their representatives to use
their power in the proper way, as Madison describes as proper. Because of this, they thought that
the people should have a middleman of sorts so that this abuse is impossible. For them, this
middleman was the states, as they would better protect the people according to the opposers. The
state government holding these powers is more protective of the people because the general
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government is too large to be able to be concerned with the entirety of the American people. The
states, on the other hand, are much smaller, and thus can be more attentive to the needs of the
people.
Speaking to Article 2, the powers of the executive, Mr. Dawson adds, “Exclusive, then,
sir, of any consideration which arises from the particular system of American politics, the guard
established against the exercise of this power is by far too slender” (Elliot 1974, 610). Mr.
Dawson thinks that there are insufficient checks on the executive in this Constitution, which is
why he is classified as understanding weak derived sovereignty. The general government is too
big a body to be able to protect the people adequately. Mr. Grayson agrees with Mr. Dawson,
saying, “How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will you call him before the Senate?
They are his counsellors and partners in crime. Where are your checks? We ought to be
extremely cautious in this country. If ever the government be changed, it will probably be into a
despotism” (Elliot 1974, 491). Mr. Grayson agrees that there are too few checks on the President,
and that this lack of checks will result in him abusing his power. If the executive is able to abuse
their power in such a way that affects and infringes upon the rights of the people, then how is he
better than a king? What is the difference? The opposition to the Constitution battles with this
question consistently when addressing Article 2, because they think that it is inevitable that the
President will abuse his powers. Mr. Monroe proposes a solution to this problem, saying, “…and
that our circumspection should be commensurate to the extent of the powers delegated, —
proceeded as follows: The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and
punishments, which are the strongest incentives to human actions” (Elliot 1974, 488). Mr.
Monroe understands that Article 2’s only real protections against the people is the sliding scale
of rewards and punishments that the President may face. He also thinks that those in charge of
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his election should be the state governments. He continues, “I believe that he will owe his
election, in fact, to the state governments, and not to the people at large” (488). He thinks that the
President should be selected by electors and not the people. Though the Constitution does
establish the electoral college as the electoral body of the President, Mr. Monroe finds this
insufficient because the electoral college is designed to listen to the popular vote of the people
and reflect their vote, to some degree. They are allowed to vote however they see fit, and for
whichever candidate they prefer, but then why have a popular election at all? The reason the
popular election is in place is to inform the decisions of the electoral college. So, then, what is
the point in it? This is the argument that Mr. Monroe is making here, and he thinks that the
solution should be to eliminate the electoral college and the popular vote and simply have the
states decide instead.
Patrick Henry was against Article 3, also because he thought it did not do enough to
protect the American people. He says, “…there is to be a trial by the jury in the state where the
fact was committed; but, sir, this state, for instance, is so large that your juries may be collected
five hundred miles from where the party resides — no neighbors who are acquainted with their
characters, their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the unfortunate man who may be thus
exposed to the rigor of that government” (Elliot 1974, 578-579). The judicial system as set up by
the Constitution does not serve the best interest of the people and makes their process of trial
much more impractical and unfair, according to Henry. The juries provided can be from different
states and cultural backgrounds, and as Mr. Henry views it, that works against the defense. This
abuse should be unconstitutional, and he thinks it should be changed. Mr. Mason agrees with
Henry here, saying that the states should be responsible for much more in the third Article than
they are. He says, “After having read the first section, Mr. Mason asked, What is there left to the
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state courts? Will any gentleman be pleased, candidly, fairly, and without sophistry, to show us
what remains? There is no limitation. It goes to every thing. The inferior courts are to be as
numerous as Congress may think proper” (Elliot 1974, 521). Mr. Mason is concerned that this
federal judiciary will undermine the role of the states in the legal system. He, and most of the rest
of the delegates in favor of weak derived sovereignty, believed that the states were more
protective of the rights of the people, so he thought that they should be in charge of the judiciary
much more so than the Constitution accounted for.
Mr. Mason continues on Article 4 saying, “…on some former part of the investigation of
this subject, gentlemen were pleased to make some observations on the security of property
coming within this section. It was then said, and I now say, that there is no security; nor have
gentlemen convinced me of this” (Elliot 1974, 585). Mr. Mason thinks that Article 4 has no
security of the people whatsoever. This is problematic because property protection is one of the
most fundamental rights of the people which the government is supposed to protect, so, to this
end, he did not think that the general government should hold most of the power of government
as opposed to the states. This shows that Mr. Mason does not agree with a strong grant of derived
sovereignty to the general government.
On the question of the Mississippi, the Anti-Federalists fought adamantly against the
general government holding the power to restrict the southern expansion into this territory. This
was a concern because the Anti-Federalists, as the minority in society, deemed expansion
necessary to gaining the majority in government. To this extent, the Anti-Federalists were
already thinking about a party-system. Mr. Grayson outlines the tension when he says, “With
respect to the Mississippi and back lands, the Eastern States are willing to relinquish that great
and essential right; for they consider the consequences of governing the Union as of more
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importance than those considerations which he mentioned should induce them to favor it” (Elliot
1974, 349). Mr. Grayson views the lack of caring from the north on the question of the
Mississippi as a way for them to maintain their power against the south. This, to him, inherently
violates the idea of a union. Patrick Henry agrees with him, saying,
Unless you keep open the Mississippi, you never can increase in number. Although your
population should go on to an infinite degree, you will be in the minority in Congress:
and although you should have a right to be the majority, yet so unhappily is this system of
politics constituted, that you will ever be a contemptible minority. To preserve the
balance of American power, it is essentially necessary that the right of the Mississippi
should be secured (Elliot 1974, 352).
Henry illustrates the concerns of the Anti-Federalists, without expansion into and past the
Mississippi River, the south will always be oppressed in this form of government simply because
they will have fewer representatives than their northern brethren because of the difference in
population. The south was very rural and had low populations, whereas the north was more
industrialized and had cities which was home to large numbers of people. The Anti-Federalists
worried that this government would prevent them from being able to be protected within the
confines of their own country. He continues, “I may have misunderstood the gentleman, but my
notes tell me that he said the House of Representatives might interfere, and prevent the
Mississippi from being given away. They have no power to do this by the Constitution. There
will be a majority against it there also. Can you find on the journals the names of those who
sacrifice your interest” (Elliot 1974, 355)? Here, he is speaking to a member of the opposition
who does not agree with Henry’s understanding of the necessity of maintaining control of the
Mississippi. He agrees with Mr. Mason that the ability of the northern states to decide the
question of the Mississippi through their congressional majority is abustive and tyrannical to the
will of the southern states. To this end, slavery also becomes an issue at this convention, but only
to a certain extent. In terms of derived sovereignty, this has implications on any decision the
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south may be able to make while serving as a representative in Congress. If their populations are
lower than those of the north, then they will have no reason to think that they will be able to pass
any legislation while in office, which is problematic to the ends of government as well as the
notion of derived sovereignty, because in this case only the north would hold any derived
sovereignty in Congress.
The delegates to the Virginia Convention, except for a few, did not seem to really care
about maintaining the slave trade and making sure it was Constitutionally protected, but they did
care about the north thinking that they were allowed any say in southern affairs, no matter what
the affair may be. Henry says, “The paper speaks to the point: they have the power in clear,
unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it. As much as I deplore slavery, I see
that prudence forbids its abolition. I deny that the general government ought to set them free,
because a decided majority of the states have not the ties of sympathy and fellow feeling for
those whose interest would be affected by their emancipation. The majority of Congress is to the
north, and the slaves are to the south” (Elliot 1974, 590). Henry does not like the idea of slaves,
but he is even more against the proposition that this document should have any say over people’s
slaves. This speaks to derived sovereignty because Mr. Henry does not think that the general
government should have the power to emancipate slaves and abolish slavery as an institution.
Anticipating, in part, the argument of Senator Stephen Douglas, these delegates place the
responsibility of determining the fate of slavery exclusively in the hands of the states.
Conclusion
The Virginia convention ultimately voted to ratify the Constitution, to Patrick Henry’s
dismay. The modes of sovereignty seen in this convention are consistent with what was found in
the Massachusetts convention, with the exception of the ‘middle’ understanding of derived
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sovereignty not being present in the Virginia convention. Outside of this, the two conventions
were very similar in understanding of sovereignty. To this end, the understandings provided in
the Virginia convention are also consistent with Mogg’s findings that the Constitution is founded
on a single, multidimensional theory of sovereignty.
The Virginia Convention solidified the idea that locating principles sovereignty with the
state governments coincides with an understanding of weak derived sovereignty. Delegates who
locate principle sovereignty with the American people, in contrast, favor strong derived
sovereignty. All twelve of the delegates holding the position that principle sovereignty resides
with the people of the United States favor the extensive grant of power provided the national
government by the Constitution. A similar pattern holds for the three delegates who locate
principle sovereignty with the state governments. Henry, Monroe, and Grayson all take the
position that the national government is given too much power and this power should reside with
the state governments. Given this pattern, the possibility of making sense of the positions of
Dawson and Harrison (unable to classify) on the principle sovereignty dimension is raised. Both
delegates hold the position that derived sovereignty should be weaker than provided by the
Constitution. If the position of these delegates is similar to the other Virginia delegates arguing
for weaker derived sovereignty, they would also locate principle sovereignty with the state
governments. Where principle sovereignty is located also helps one to make sense of George
Mason who is the only delegate to the Virginia Ratifying Convention to locate principle
sovereignty with the people of the states. Mason’s preference for popular sovereignty at the state
level leads him to favor granting the state governments greater power while minimizing the
power of the national government. Given the presence of these relationships, a key implication of
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the results presented here points to the need to consider how delegates understood the
mechanism linking the two dimensions of sovereignty—representation.
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Table One: Delegate Positions on Principle Sovereignty at the
Virginia State Ratifying Convention
People
n=13
Mr. Pendleton

Mr. George Mason*

States
n=3

Non-Classifiable
n=2

Mr. Henry

Mr. Dawson

Mr. Wilson Nicholas

Mr. Monroe

Mr. Harrison

Mr. George Nicholas

Mr. Grayson

Gov. Randolph
Mr. Madison
Mr. Lee
Mr. Corbin
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Wythe
Mr. Innes
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Stephen
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Table Two: Delegate Positions on Derived Sovereignty at the
Virginia State Ratifying Convention
Strong
n=12

Weak
n=6

Mr. Pendleton

Mr. Henry

Mr. Wilson Nicholas

Mr. George Mason

Mr. George Nicholas

Mr. Monroe

Gov. Randolph

Mr. Grayson

Mr. Madison

Mr. Dawson

Mr. Lee

Mr. Harrison

Non-Classifiable
n=0

Mr. Corbin
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Wythe
Mr. Innes
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Stephen
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
The analyses presented here for the Massachusetts and Virginia Ratifying Conventions
show sovereignty was understood as a multidimensional concept. The first dimension, principle
sovereignty, concerns the question of where the ultimate authority is society resides. In both
cases studies here, this authority is placed in the hands of the American people. The second
dimension, derived sovereignty, concerns the amount of authority given the national government
by the US Constitution and here evidence indicates that derived sovereignty can be understood
along a continuum ranging from weak to strong. In other words, when it comes to the power of
the national government, some viewed the Constitution as granting too much power and that it
was necessary to limit the grant or power in order to protect fundamental rights and liberties.
Others, in contrast, view the grant of power as essential to securing these same rights and
liberties. These results reveal a consistent understanding of both dimensions of sovereignty
across both conventions, with the exception of a few minor discrepancies. Thus, the results
presented here provide additional support for Mogg’s (2006) reading of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. Whether this similarity is actually a relationship in understanding or simply
a commonality of all citizens begs to be answered, but nonetheless the understandings of
sovereignty are consistent.
The two conventions were similar in nature but radically different in details. The
Massachusetts Convention was fairly straightforward. It was rather short, the debate was
effective but not outlandish in speech or argument, and it was also very limited. The
Massachusetts Convention almost exclusively discussed derived sovereignty, most specifically
Article 1 Section 8. It was limited in its nature as well as its participation, as less than 20% of the
convention actually spoke during the course of the debate. Virginia, however, though also
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limited in participation, had a much more extensive debate in terms arguing the language of the
document at hand. The Virginia Convention, in terms of page lengths of the debate records, was
three times longer than that of Massachusetts. The debate also covered the whole document
rather than just a specific few clauses as we saw with Massachusetts.
Though the two conventions were different in detail they were very similar in terms of
the content of the debates themselves. The understandings of sovereignty derived from the
document remained mostly consistent between the two debates. Both conventions identified
principle sovereignty as resting with the American people or the state governments, with a
couple of delegates operationalizing this with the people of the state. The biggest distinction in
the understanding of sovereignty between the two debates was with derived sovereignty. Here,
both conventions had an understanding of weak and strong derived sovereignty, but unlike the
Massachusetts Convention, the Virginia Convention did not show any evidence of any delegates
switching their position on ratification due to the addition of amendments. Virginia also
introduced amendments, but they did not hold the same influence that they did in Massachusetts.
Fortunately, the swayed amendment votes were not necessary to the ultimate ratification of the
Constitution in Virginia.
The language of the debate in Massachusetts was overall more delicate, arguably, than
that of Virginia as well. In Massachusetts, the delegates seemed to listen to each other more and
respect the people they were sparring with, whereas in Virginia, they still had respect for their
fellow delegates, but they were much less polite in their speech. While both conventions
contained language of personal attacks against various delegates, this was seen much more in
Virginia than Massachusetts. Part of this can be attributed to the more robust discussion of the
Constitution as is seen in Virginia, but the other part can be attributed to varying strong opinions.
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Massachusetts did not really feature any delegates who were adamantly and persistently against
the ratification of the Constitution. There were plenty of delegates who did not like the document
and did not want it to be signed into government, but they were not as vocal or angry, arguably,
about the Constitution as delegates to the Virginia convention were. The language of the Virginia
debate contained many more strongly worded speeches than did Massachusetts, and therefore I
was able to get a better understanding of the levels of sovereignty described at the Virginia
convention than at the Massachusetts for individual delegates. I was able to classify more
delegates in Massachusetts, but I was able to give more detailed accounts of the understandings
of certain delegates from Virginia because they spoke more to these understandings. Further, the
Virginia convention addresses the issue of slavery, though in a very limited manner. Most of the
debate between the two sides about this were about population sizes across the states, and the
worry of the Anti-Federalists that this document will prevent the expansion of the southern states
to the Mississippi, so they will be in the minority of Congress for the entirety of government.
This question, or anything outside of the direct language of the document, really, was not
addressed in the Massachusetts convention, showing the importance of this topic as providing the
main difference between Massachusetts and Virginia in terms of political grounding:
industrialization. Massachusetts was becoming increasingly industrialized during this time,
whereas Virginia was still filled with plantation owners and farmers. To this end, the population
of Massachusetts, and most of the northern states, was much higher than that of Virginia. The
people of Virginia worried about this because they feared the northerners would undermine the
ability of the southern states to protect their rights and their property in government.
When combined with the analysis and argument of Mogg, the results presented here have
implications for how one should consider the issue of sovereignty in American politics. In
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particular, the multi-dimensionality of sovereignty highlights the need for clarity and the need for
clarity speaks directly to James Madison’s concern with the problem of language. In Federalist
#37, Madison warns his reader about the problems inherent in language. He writes, “…The
obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the
medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh
embarrassment” (#37: 183). Here, Madison suggests that the imperfection of language has the
effect of rendering complex ideas and concepts more obscure. He writes, “The faculties of the
mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the
efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37: 182). Thus, if the requisite
precision lies beyond the capacities of the “most acute and metaphysical philosophers” (#37:
182), it is reasonable to conclude that this level of precision is beyond the capabilities of the
people and their elected and unelected officials. Of all of the issues considered by the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison highlights, “…the arduous…task of marking
the proper line of partition, between the authority of the general, and that of the state
governments” (#37: 182). For Madison, it is the topic of sovereignty where the language
available to the delegates proves most insufficient. Scholars working on this topic should give
Madison’s warning the attention it deserves.
The results for the Massachusetts and Virginia Ratifying Conventions presented here
have implications for how one should understand the debate between nationalists and federalists
over the nature of sovereignty in the United States. As Mogg (2006) concludes, this debate has
progressed very little on account of the fact that it has not been equipped with the proper
vocabulary (the distinction between principle and derived sovereignty) to answer the question
posed. Equipped with this analytic distinction and considering the question of who possesses
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principle sovereignty, the results presented here support the nationalist argument. While a few
delegates hold the position that principle sovereignty resides with the states, the overwhelming
majority of delegates locate principle sovereignty in the hands of the American people (see
Wood 1977 & 1988, Breen 1997, Ferguson 2000, Roche 1961, Jensen 1943, Rossiter 1966).
These results also confirm a central element of the partly federal and partly national
interpretation of the Constitution. These scholars (see Diamond 1992, Powell 1987, McDonald
1985) correctly consider the implications of Madison’s warning about the ambiguity of language.
The problem is that these scholars never apply this warning to the common assumption
informing the research in this area: that the US Constitution is informed by a single, coherent
theory of sovereignty. Thus, these scholars miss the analytic distinction between principle and
derived sovereignty that characterizes the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and at least two of
the state ratifying conventions.
These results, when combined with those of Mogg (2006), point to the utility of
approaching debates over the Constitution from a delegate centered approach that looks at each
individual delegate across the duration of the proceedings. In doing so, evidence is presented to
indicate that these debates are more informed by ideas than self-interest. The fact that individual
delegates have structured, consistent positions on sovereignty is consistent with other scholars
who contend for the priority of ideas (see McDonald 1985 & 2004, Adair 1998, Powell 1987,
Diamond 1992, Wood 1987 & 1998, Rossiter 1966, Rackove 1987) over self-interest (see Jensen
1943, Onuf 1988, Morgan 1988, Beard 1935). Given the limited focus of this study (the
Massachusetts and Virginia Ratifying Conventions) and the fact that only Mogg (2006) has
applied the methodology used here, prudence dictates that this conclusion be viewed with a
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certain amount of doubt. However, it is certainly possible to replicate these studies in other
ratifying conventions and to do something similar for other concepts present in the Constitution.
Finally, this study speaks to how scholars should approach the study of American
political thought. Students of American political thought should not only pay greater attention to
the state ratifying conventions, but they should be mindful of the fact that these conventions will
not simply confirm or reject previously articulated understandings of key terms. While this study
set out to confirm or reject the understanding of sovereignty identified by Mogg (2006), it was
able to add to her understanding of sovereignty. This indicates that the meaning of key aspects of
American political thought are likely never set in stone. Rather, they are continually being
reconsidered, revised, and added to by the various actors of the American political system.
Both of the analyses provided here remain limited in certain aspects, however. In
Massachusetts, the main limitation was the number of participating delegates to the debate. Most
delegates sat and listened to the arguments made in Massachusetts, while very few actually
contributed to them. This helps to explain the very narrow scope of discussion as is seen in the
Massachusetts record, as well as provide limitations for how well we can truly classify these
delegates as a whole. Despite the ultimate vote to ratify, it is possible that one or more of the
delegates who did not speak at the convention held some sort of different understanding about
what they think sovereignty should look like, but we will never know if that was the case. In
Virginia, we see a similar problem. Though the participation is higher, proportionately, in
Virginia than in Massachusetts, this debate had almost the opposite problem with the lack of
participation. In Virginia, the debate was absolutely dominated by a few delegates who provided
long accounts for their understandings and opinions on government. To this end, it’s possible
that, opposite from Massachusetts, Virginia’s delegates simply could not get a word in, and that
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is why their participation was so low. Massachusetts had about double the delegates in
attendance that Virginia did, providing for the confusion on participation. Further, Virginia’s
convention consisted of many ‘giants,’ as Maier (2011, 257) wrote, so it is also possible that the
delegates who were not included in that description knew their position in the debate to be a sort
of ‘standing room only’ situation, and they knew that they were not there to contribute to the
debate but only to contribute to the vote.
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Appendix 1: Massachusetts Vignettes
Mr. Widgery – New Gloucester:
People of the State, Weak
Mr. Widgery was against the idea that Congress should have the power of direct
taxation5, and he was not quiet in his arguments against this article. He said, “If Congress…have
this power of taxing directly, it will be in their power to enact a poll tax. Can gentlemen tell why
they will not attempt it, and by this method make the poor pay as much as the rich” (1251)? He
was worried that if Congress had the power to tax, then they would abuse their power and
therefore undermine the sovereignty of the American people. Mr. Widgery’s concern here is with
derived sovereignty, and not giving the general government too much derived sovereignty. His
concern with poll taxes speaks to his understanding of principled sovereignty (the people are
principle). He believes this to be the power of the people and not the general government.
Though he doesn’t indicate who the “people” are, those of Massachusetts or of America, it is
clear that he believes this power should remain with the principle sovereign. This is reinforced
by his use of “rich,” as this points to a concern with the development of an aristocracy in
America.
Mr. Widgery was also against the idea that the Constitution should be passed quickly
simply out of necessity. He says, “"Gentlemen say we are undone, and that there is no resource,
unless this Constitution is adopted. I cannot see why we need, for the sake of a little meat,
swallow a great bone, which, if it should happen to stick in our throats, can never be got out"
(1353). Overall, Mr. Widgery’s main concern was the American people, and he believed that the
people of America are the principle sovereign. However, there was also the concern that, should
this direct taxation power be awarded to Congress, would it be too much power? He believed in
the people as principle but also questioned the amount of power which the derived should have.

5

He was mainly against Article 1 Section 8
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Mr. Sedgwick – Stockbridge:
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Sedgwick was initially appointed to the committee to establish the rules for the
Convention, along with Mr. Widgery. He is widely democratic and believes in the internal
checks and balances of government. Meaning that he understands that the Constitution in
question will work to self-regulate government rather than having the people worrying about a
potential aristocracy forming. This shows Mr. Sedgwick’s understanding of the people as the
principle sovereign, and it shows that his understanding of derived sovereignty says that big
government is good, and they should have more expansive power based upon the checks and
balances of government.
Mr. Sedgwick believes in the people’s right to elect legislators, and he believes that the
ultimate power of government comes from the sovereignty of the people. In response to the
argument that representatives should meet a certain property ownership standard, Sedgwick says,
“…that this objection was founded on an anti-democratical principle, and was surprised that
gentlemen who appeared so strenuously to advocate the rights of the people, should wish to
exclude from the federal government a good man, because he was not a rich one” (1236). This
shows his commitment to the people as the principle sovereign because he believes that it is
within the rights, and for the good will of the people to have any man be able to run for office, no
matter his financial status.
He continues, in response to an article stating that representatives are able to choose their
own salary, “Can a man…who has the least respect for the good opinion of his fellowcountrymen, go home to his constituents, after having robbed them by voting himself an
exorbitant salary? This principle will be a most powerful check; and in respect to economy, the
power lodged as it is in this section will be more advantageous to the people than if retained by
the state legislatures” (1284). This shows his understanding of this Constitution creating a union
rather than a confederacy, as well as the people being principle sovereign. In his argument for the
people being principle, he said that the people would only be voting for proper officials who
maintain morals and work for the good of the people, and therefore there is no need to forbid
representatives from choosing their own salary because if a representative begins to abuse this
power, then the people will simply vote them out of office. As for his understanding of this
government being representative of a union, he says, “the power lodged as it is in this section
will be more advantageous to the people than if retained by the state legislatures” (1284). This
shows the key difference between the Articles of Confederation and this new Constitution: in the
Articles the people did not have the power to remove elected officials, and in the Constitution the
people do have this power. Since the Articles represented a confederation, this power was
exercised solely by the parties to the confederacy, so the states would have all of this power
rather than the people. This shows his support for the people as principle. This further shows that
even when the staunch advocates of state power discuss the people, they have a very democratic
understanding of how politics should work. The protection of the people is always the most
important question for a government, and Mr. Sedgwick here thinks that the power of the recall
is both secure and rightly held by the people. This speaks to his understanding of derived
sovereignty as well because it shows his support for the grant of power in the Constitution, and
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that he thinks that there are proper checks on government because he thinks the power is well
placed and important.
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Dr. Taylor – New Marlborough
State Government, Confederacy, Weak
Dr. Taylor views the state government as being the principle sovereign. He has an
understanding of this new government creating a confederacy rather than a union. Though he
clearly shows some confusion in understanding the key differences between the ideals of a
confederacy and union, he speaks to the development of a confederacy. He says on the topic of
annual versus biennial elections,
By the Articles of Confederation, annual elections are provided for, though we have
additional securities in a right to recall any or all of our members from Congress, and a
provision for rotation. In the proposed Constitution, there is no provision for rotation; we
have no right by it to recall our delegates. In answer to the observations, that, by
frequency of elections, good men will be excluded, I answer, if they behave well, it is
probable they will be continued; but if they behave ill, how shall we remedy the evil? It is
possible that rulers may be appointed who may wish to root out the liberties of the people
(1185-1186).
Dr. Taylor is still very committed to the idea that a confederation is the proper structure
for this government (Articles of Confederation), though he shows some confusion of language in
his true understanding of this difference. He neglects to understand that, under the new
government, the people would have the power to remove representatives from office. Under the
Articles, this power was given to the parties and state governments, and this shift in power is
something which Dr. Taylor has misunderstood. Dr. Taylor is democratic and non-democratic at
the same time. He agrees with the democratic principles of removal of office but does not think
that this power should go to the people.
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Judge Dana – Cambridge
People, Union, Middle
Judge Dana has a robust understanding of the people as principle. He believes in a union
form of government and the people voting for all elected officials. He says on the topic of
representation size,
…if the Constitution under consideration was in fact what its opposers had often called it,
a consolidation of the states, he should readily agree with that gentleman that the
representation of the people was much too small; but this was a charge brought against it
without any foundation in truth. So far from it, that it must be apparent to every one, that
the federal government springs out of, and can alone be brought into existence by, the
state governments. Demolish the latter, and there is an end of the former (1238).
His understanding of government here, reflects that the state governments are the principle.
Should the state governments be demolished, the federal government would be too. The people
are nowhere to be found in his understanding of sovereignty as stated here.
He continues, on the topic of amendments to the Constitution,
It contained, he said, the amendments generally wished for, as they were not of a local
nature, but extended to every part of the Union. If they were recommended to be adopted
by this Convention, it was very probable that two thirds of the Congress would concur in
promising them; or that two thirds of the legislatures of the Several states would apply for
the call of a convention to consider them, agreeably to the mode pointed out in the
Constitution… (1403).
He wants the amendments because they would further protect the liberties of the people. He
believes that the delegates to the Constitution would also agree to these amendments. This
speaks to his understanding of derived sovereignty as it would be giving Congress the power to
protect the inalienable rights of the people, but also shows that there is a necessity in this
government to better protect the rights of the people. In the passage of the Constitution with
amendments, there are three tiers of derived sovereignty: those for the ratification with
amendments, those against and those that are stuck in the middle and need to be swayed either
way.
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Dr. Jarvis – Boston
People, Union, Strong
Dr. Jarvis has a robust understanding of the people as principle. On Congress having the
power of election, he says, “…that there is a very material distinction in the two cases; for,
however possible it may be that this controlling authority may be abused, it by no means
followed that Congress, in any situation, could strip the people of their right to a direct
representation” (20). His use of ‘direct representation’ speaks to his understanding of the people
as principle. He believes that the representatives to the national government should be selected
by the people rather than the state legislatures. This also speaks to his understanding of
individual rights of the people and his willingness to stand up for such rights. He understands
that the people are in control no matter what; there should be no breach of the control of the
people to control elections and vote for any and all representatives. He continues, “The right of
election, founded on the principle of equality, was…the basis on which the whole superstructure
was erected; this right was inherent in the people; it was unalienable in its nature, and it could
not be destroyed without presuming a power to subvert the Constitution…” (20). Our country,
pre-Constitution, was grounded upon principles of equality of man in terms of election, as Dr.
Jarvis understands it, meaning that giving up this power to Congress would give too much power
to the derived sovereign. He added, on the same topic of election, “He considered the
Constitution as an elective democracy, in which the sovereignty still rested in the people…” (20).
This simply exemplifies his commitment to the people as sovereign.
Dr. Jarvis also believes that the Constitution will create a union structure of government.
He says, on the debate over the passage of the Constitution with amendments, “If it be alleged
that this union is not likely to happen, will it be more likely that a union of a greater number of
concurring sentiments may be had, as must be, in case we reject the Constitution in hopes of a
better? But that this is practicable, we may safely appeal to the history of this country as a proof,
in the last twenty years” (1374). He believes that, even if the amendments should not pass, this
Constitution is the best way to establish a union and maintain the people as principle. Dr. Jarvis
belongs to the camp of delegates who are in favor of passing the Constitution with amendments,
though would also have ratified if the amendments were not in place.
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Mr. Dalton – Newbury
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Dalton’s participation during the MA ratifying convention is sparse. When not
sparring with Mr. Randall over the fertility of the soil in the South (1244), Mr. Dalton appears on
the record only three more times. Fortunately, two of the three appearances allow Mr. Dalton to
be classified as locating principle sovereignty with the people and being in favor of strong
derived sovereignty located at the national level.
The former position is indicated by Mr. Dalton’s support of proportional representation.
He speaks favorably of the proposed Constitution’s reliance on proportional representation of the
people in contrast to the equal representation of the states under the Articles. Appealing to
political self-interest, Mr. Dalton notes that this would benefit Massachusetts (1255) and that this
change explains why he changes his position on the power to tax, He says, “…said we had
obtained a great deal by the new Constitution. By the Confederation each state had an equal vote.
Georgia is now content with three eighths of the voice of Massachusetts” (1255).
Mr. Dalton’s explanation for why his position changes allows one to derive his positions
of principled and derived sovereignty. According to him, replacing the equal representation of
the states with proportional representation based on population in the House serves as an
adequate ground for changing his position on imposts. He reasons that the Article I, Section 8
grant of power is safe under the proposed Constitution because the people have adequate checks
to prevent the abuse of this power. He says,
Sir, I was opposed to the five per cent. impost being granted to Congress; and I conceived
that such a grant, under the Confederation, would produce great difficulties and
embarrassments. But, sir, as Congress is, by the proposed Constitution, to be differently
constructed, as a proportionate voice of the states in that body is to be substituted for the
present equal (or rather unequal) one, my objections will be removed. In my opinion, the
delegating of power to a government in which the people have so many checks, will be
perfectly safe, and consistent with the preservation of their liberties (1352).
By locating adequate checks to prevent the abuse of power in the hands of the American people,
Mr. Dalton indicates that they serve as the principle sovereign. This position is supported by the
fact that Mr. Dalton views power of derived sovereignty as something that this delegated to the
general government (1352) which accords with the login of the principle-agent relationship.
As for Mr. Dalton’s position on derived sovereignty, he can be classified as favoring a
strong national government. This is evident in his position on proposing amendments to the
Constitution. He is clear that he is fine with the document as is, but he is willing to support
amendments as long as they are “of a conciliatory nature, and not as a concession that the
amendments are necessary” (1407).
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Mr. G. Dench (Capt. Dench) – Hopkinton
People of the States, Confederacy, Weak
Capt. Dench’s participation in the debates was rather minimal. He spoke mostly for
points of clarification, but he was more active in the debate when the question of sovereignty
arose. Capt. Dench is an example of the difficulties surrounding sovereignty and to ambiguity of
language.
His lack of clarity regarding the nature of sovereignty caused Dench to confuse a
confederacy and a union. On Congress having the power of taxation, he says, “…it had been
observed, and he was not convinced that the observation was wrong, that the grant of the powers
in this section would produce a consolidation of the states, and the moment it begins, a
dissolution of the state governments commences. If mistaken, he wished to be set right” (1338).
Should this show his understanding of sovereignty, he would understand it more in a confederate
view, meaning that the state governments would be principle. This is understood because he is
greatly concerned with the consolidation of states. He does not identify here that giving this
power of direct taxation to Congress would be a breach of derived sovereignty, awarding too
much of this to the general government. Rather, he is concerned for the states, showing an
understanding of a confederacy. Given that the power to tax is also the power to destroy, this
shows that he is not concerned with the potential of the power to destroy or act on the individual,
which clearly shows the states as principle sovereign. However, this is arguably the result of a
misunderstanding in definition of sovereignty and application thereof. It could be argued that,
although he is concerned with the state governments, this does not mean that he views them as
principle. Rather, he could simply understand that these bodies are necessary for government to
function regardless of where sovereignty lies, though there is no proof of this understanding.
As the debate continues, and Capt. Dench speaks more frequently, we can see his
understanding of sovereignty shift immensely. Towards the end of the Convention, when the
question of amendments begins, he provides a motion to stop the Convention until a later time in
order to reach out to the people and share with them the amendments they proposed, and
hopefully gain their support. The motion was stated as such: “‘That, for the purpose of informing
the good people of this commonwealth of the principles of the proposed federal Constitution. and
the amendments offered by his excellency, the president, and reported by the committee, and of
uniting their opinions respecting the same, this Convention do adjourn to a future day’” (1450).
His motion was rejected, as most delegates were concerned with the speedy passage of the
Constitution. However, this shows the shift in his understanding of sovereignty. His concern with
the approval of the residents of Massachusetts creates tension with his original understanding of
the states as principle sovereign. This could possibly be Capt. Dench revealing the idea that at
the heart of an understanding of confederacy is an understanding of popular sovereignty. He
could be saying that the people of a state are the principle and state governments are the agent or
the body which exercises derived sovereignty. This would also mean that the Continental
Congress exercises derived sovereignty from the state governments. This reveal is a possibility,
but there is no way to know for sure as the ambiguity of language causes problems in resolving
this tension.
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Mr. Gorham – Charlestown
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Gorham is quick to clear up any confusion that may have come to the Convention
floor, as well as provide more contextual understandings of topics such as representation in
Congress, the power of taxation in Congress, as well as proposed amendments to the
Constitution. Though Mr. Gorham speaks somewhat frequently at the convention, most of his
recorded speech speaks to these factual corrections rather than his understanding of sovereignty.
Thus, it is necessary to infer theoretical positions from the particular, concrete positions he takes
over the course of the convention.
On the topic of Congress potentially abusing power with the power of direct taxation, he
says,
With respect to the proposed government degenerating into an aristocracy, the honorable
gentleman observed, that the nature and situation of our country rendered such a
circumstance impossible; as, from the great preponderance of the agricultural interest in
the United States, that interest would always have it in its power to elect such men as
would, he observed, effectually prevent the introduction of any other than a perfectly
democratical form of government (1302-1303).
Here he states that he has an understanding of a democratic form of government, which would
speak to the people being sovereign except that he makes no clarification of who might elect
these officials. It can be deduced, however, that he prefers the people as principle because he
shows an understanding of the language of the Constitution to be correct: that the people will be
able to select an adequate representative. This also points to his agreeance in providing the
general government with more derived sovereignty, however, creating an understanding that he
believes that the derived should contain more power than other delegates might propose. Mr.
Gorham is a strong nationalist. He speaks to the internal checks on this power, and Mr. Gorham
deems them sufficient in protecting from a potential breach of power in Congress.
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Mr. Parsons
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Parsons speaks to his desire to ratify throughout the entire convention. He does not
stray from his understanding that this Constitution should be adopted as it is good for the people.
Mr. Parsons has an understanding of the people as principle. He says, “The legislatures of the
several states are the constituents of the Senate, and the people are the constituents of the
Representatives. These two branches, therefore, have different constituents, and as they are
designed as mutual checks upon each other, and to balance the legislative powers, there will be
frequent struggles and contentions between them” (1217). Here, Parsons explicitly states his
understanding that the people are represented in the House and the state governments are
represented in the Senate. In the convention, this was the initial understanding of popular
sovereignty of government. The people were supposed to choose their representatives in election
while the state governments were supposed to elect the Senators. Since the people also elected
the state governments, this was meant to be an extension of the people as principle with a
middle-man. Mr. Parsons understands this divide of sovereignty and therefore views the people
as principle.
Mr. Parsons has a robust understanding of checks and balances, which still shows the
people as principle but changes his understanding of sovereignty slightly because he does not
believe necessarily in the power of recall or the addition of the bill of rights as further protection
for the people (1327-1328). So, while he believes that the people have the right to elect their
officials and those officials should work for the will of the people, he does not think that the
proposed Constitution needs any further securities for the people. This arguably goes against the
understanding that people are principle, as it is denying them potential liberties that could protect
them should government become aristocratic. However, Mr. Parsons simply believes that these
things are already accounted for in the new Constitution, and therefore they do not need to be
reiterated. He says, “Sir, gentlemen do not distinguish between the government of an hereditary
aristocracy, where the interest of the governors is very different from that of the subjects, and a
government to be administered for the common good by the servants of the people, vested with
delegated powers by popular elections at stated periods” (1324). This shows Mr. Parson’s
commitment to the principle as people. Although he does not believe there is a need for such
other securities to the Constitution as a bill of rights or recall, he still understands that the
government is working for the people, which maintains his views of the people as principle
sovereign.
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Mr. King
People, Union, Strong
Mr. King spoke quite frequently starting the election, but slowly stopped speaking. He
was, however, the only delegate to openly oppose slavery. Mr. King also believes that the people
should have the power to remove their representatives should they no longer be working for the
will of the people, showing his commitment to the people as principle sovereign. He says, “…but
that the time should not be so long as to remove from his mind the powerful check upon his
conduct, that arises from the frequency of elections, whereby the people are enabled to remove
an unfaithful representative, or to continue a faithful one” (1203). Mr. King was concerned with
the question of possible aristocracy in government. He believes that the government should work
for the people who elected them, and should they abuse that power, then they will be removed
from office. Mr. King also has an understanding that the internal checks and balances of
government is strong and enough to prevent aristocracy.
Mr. King is also the first and only delegate to question the language of the Constitution
compared to those of the Articles of Confederation. When discussing the powers of Congress, he
says,
The introduction to this Constitution is in these words: "We, the people," &c. The
language of the Confederation is, "We, the states," &c. The latter is a mere federal
government of states. Those, therefore, that assemble under it, have no power to
make laws to apply to the individuals of the states confederated; and the attempts
to make laws for collective societies necessarily leave a discretion to comply with
them or not (1285).
He understands that We the States represents the ideals of a confederacy whereas We the People
represents a union structure. His understanding of a “federal government of the states” means
that the state governments chose the federal representatives, not the people. And since that
clearly did not work and there was too little power federally, this new route is to be adopted with
the new understanding of the people as principle sovereign rather than the state governments. He
also believes that a bigger grant of derived power to the federal government is necessary. He
says, “Sir, it has been objected to the proposed Constitution, that the power is too great, and by
this Constitution is to be sacred. But if the want of power is the defect in the old Confederation,
there is a fitness and propriety in adopting what is here proposed, which gives the necessary
power wanted” (1287). The initial power that he is referring to is direct taxation in Congress. Mr.
King believes that the people are principle, but that more derived sovereignty needs to be placed
in the hands of Congress in order to protect the people. As he notes, the Articles did not provide
enough federal power, which caused the downfall of that government. In learning from previous
mistakes, Mr. King speaks to give more derived power to the Congress in order to (hopefully)
prevent another fall in government.
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Mr. T. Dawes
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Dawes was one of the very few at the convention to address the conflict of slavery in
relation to the proposed Constitution and representation. Though he did not really give an official
count of his feelings towards the representation of slaves in government, he did stand up for their
rights to be viewed as people rather than property (1244). Mr. Dawes was also one of the
strongest proponents for Congress having the derived power of taxation. He says, “That
Congress, however, will not apply to the power of direct taxation, unless in cases of
emergency…as thirty thousand inhabitants will elect a representative, eight tenths of which
electors perhaps are yeomen, and holders of farms, it will be their own faults if they are not
represented by such men as will never permit the land to be injured by unnecessary taxes”
(1289). From his understanding, Congress vesting this power will have no effect on the people
unless there is a national emergency where the rapid funds are necessary. In which case,
Congress would need this power in order to protect the people. This exhibits Mr. Dawes’
understanding of both principle and derived sovereignty. He states that the inhabitants will elect
their representative, showing that the people are principle sovereign because he does not mention
anything about state governments. He is also shown to be willing to award the necessary powers
to the general government for the protection of the people, showing his robust understanding of
derived sovereignty and the principle sovereignty of the people keeping these derived powers in
check.
Mr. Dawes blames fear for the unwillingness of other delegates to award Congress the
derived power of taxation. He is a member of the derived sovereignty camp which understands
that a strong general government is necessary for the protection of the people. Under the Articles
of Confederation, there was a very weak national government and it collapsed, triggering the
creation of this newly proposed Constitution. Mr. Dawes recognizes this shift in necessary
powers and is willing to award Congress the derived powers which it needs to protect the people
while also maintaining checks and balances so that the government won’t turn aristocratic. He
says, “Those who never objected to such an authority in Congress, as vested by the old
Confederation, surely ought not to object to such a power in Congress, where there is to be a new
branch of representation, arising immediately from the people…” (1337). He says that this
derived power should not be feared because it is now coming from the authority of the people
directly. Since representatives will now have to answer to the people as principle sovereign, they
will not be able to abuse such a power because the people will not allow it, and that
representative will not be reelected. He continues, “…he thought the powers in the paragraph
under debate should be fully vested in Congress. We have suffered, said he, for want of such
authority in the federal head” (1287). He recognizes the necessity of this derived power, but only
when authorized by the principle sovereign, the people. Strong national
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Mr. Randall
People of the States, Hybrid, Weak
Mr. Randall is rather quiet during the convention and only speaks up a handful of times.
However, when he does speak, he exhibits his robust understanding of the people as principle
sovereign. He says, “Let us consider, sir, we are acting for the people, and for ages unborn; let us
deal fairly and above board. Every one comes here to discharge his duty to his constituents, and I
hope none will be biased by the best orators; because we are not acting for ourselves. I think
Congress ought to have power, such as is for the good of the nation…” (1244). Here, Mr.
Randall shows his commitment to the people as principle sovereign while also briefly touching
on his understanding of derived sovereignty. He urges the convention to take this debate
seriously and to discuss openly and honestly, as this is for the good of the people. Randall
understands that the delegates to the convention were simply the constituents of the people and
worked for the good will thereof. This shows his understanding of the people as principle
sovereign. As for his understanding of derived sovereignty, he does not specify the powers which
he thinks should be vested in Congress, but he does say that he understands that derived powers
are necessary so long as they do not create tension with the people being principle.
Mr. Randall may have this understanding of the people as principle, but he does not agree
that this government should create a union. He says, “Our manners, he said, were widely
different from the Southern States; their elections were not so free and unbiased; therefore, if the
states were consolidated, he thought it would introduce manners among us which would set us at
continual variance” (1303). He is concerned with the difference of opinion between the Northern
and Southern states under this newly proposed union structure. This creates tension with which
entity he believes to be principle sovereign. His opposition to a union suggests that the state
governments should be principle, but his previous statements suggest that the people are
principle. It is not clear, but it could be possible that in the first quote, Mr. Randall only
understood the people as principle in terms of this convention. He may believe that outside of
this that the state governments should be principle sovereign to the general government’s status
as derived sovereign. It seems as though Mr. Randall’s idea of the structure of government
should marry the ideas of a union and confederacy. In his understanding, the people elect the
state governments, and the states elect the state’s federal representatives.
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Hon. Mr. Bowdoin
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Bowdoin’s participation in the convention is extensive. He spoke greatly on the topic
of powers of Congress as well as representation in government. He is one of the few at the
convention who has a clear understanding of the difference between a confederacy and a union,
but he does not really say which he agrees with more, he rather lays out the facts of
understanding on the two different structures. He says, “…if the foregoing principles are true,
that we ought to adopt a confederation, presuming the different states well calculated for
republican governmental; for, if they are not, their corruption will work their destruction
separately” (1393). This shows his understanding that a confederacy has the state governments as
principle. He continues, “But the advantages of a union of the states are not confined to mere
safety from within or without. They extend not only to the welfare of each state, but even to the
interest of each individual of the states” (1393). Here he shows his understanding of the people
as principle in a union structure of government. This is the extent to his discussion of the
union/confederacy question, so we don’t know his personal views on the topic.
Mr. Bowdoin extensively speaks to his understanding of derived sovereignty. On the
topic of the direct taxation power of Congress, he says, “If they were to be a distinct body, then
the doctrine of precaution, which gentlemen use, would be necessary; but, sir, they can make no
laws, nor levy any taxes, but those to which they themselves must be subservient; they
themselves must bear a part; therefore our security is guarantied by their being thus subject to the
laws, if by nothing else” (1193-1194). Mr. Bowdoin is willing to give Congress more derived
sovereignty. He understands them to be one with the people in the sense that they will also suffer
the consequences of high taxes as they will not be excluded from taxes as citizens. This, he
believes, is a sufficient enough check on the power of Congress to award them such derived
sovereignty. He continues, “…that the investiture of such power, so far from being an objection,
is a most cogent reason for accepting the Constitution. The power of Congress, both in the
legislative and executive line, is the power of the people” (1319). This hints at his understanding
of the people as principle. However, we cannot readily say that this is a fact because of his
tension between union and confederacy. His inability to express which he believes in leaves
questions about his commitment to the principle sovereign, as we cannot predict which structure
of government which he understood the Constitution to create. He does, however, exemplify an
understanding that the people have principle sovereignty in some capacity. It is unknown
whether the people and state governments are both principle sovereign or if it’s just the people.
He says, “All power is derived, mediately or immediately, from the people, in all the
constitutions. This is the case with the federal Constitution. The electors of representatives to the
state governments are electors of representatives to the federal government” (1391). His use of
‘mediately or immediately’ shows the tension in his understanding of who are principle
sovereign. If this power was derived immediately from the people, then the people would be
principle, but if it was derived immediately from the people, then the state governments share
some capacity of principle sovereignty with them. He speaks to this about the role of Senate and
the state legislatures. Rather than the state governments being principle for the Senate, they are
simply a middle man for the people, showing his support for the people as principle. However,
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we cannot be sure either way because Mr. Bowdoin does not fully express his personal
understanding of principle sovereignty on the convention floor.
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Hon. Mr. Phillips
Strong
Mr. Phillips is not very involved in the debate of the Constitution. He only provides one
speech which contained any understanding that I could classify. Every other time he is
mentioned there is nothing that can be learned from his speech. Mr. Phillips speaks to the power
of Congress to be able to tax (1301). Though he speaks adamantly in favor of this, he does not
provide any understanding of sovereignty to back it up, but rather uses means of comparison
with other arguments proposed at the convention as well as the tactic of fear of living without
this derived power in Congress. He says, “There seems to be a suspicion that this power will be
abused; but is not all delegation of power equally dangerous” (1301)? He brings up the point that
power of any kind is subject to abuse. However, this derived power to Congress is necessary to
the well-being of the country. Without this, we could end up in even more dangerous situations
such as an unfunded war or national crisis.
The only understanding of sovereignty which Mr. Phillips provides is his support for
Congress having the derived power of taxation. He does not mention anything regarding a union
or confederacy, nor does he give any suggestion to who might be principle sovereign.
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Mr. Davis – Boston
Non-Classifiable
Mr. Davis speaks only once at the convention on the topic of a federal town. In his short
addition to the debate, he seems to misunderstand the difference between a confederation and a
union, but he provides no other understanding of principle or derived sovereignty. He says,
“…that it was the intention of Congress, under the Confederation, to erect a federal town. He
asked, Would Massachusetts, or any other state, wish to give to New York, or the state in which
Congress shall sit, the power to influence the proceedings of that body, which was to act for the
benefit of the whole, by leaving them liable to the outrage of the citizens of such states” (1339)?
He first says that, “it was the intention of Congress under the Confederation” to construct a
federal town, then as he continues, he outlines the understanding that the Congress is to act for
the whole, which would provide an understanding of the people as principle for the general
government. However, this understanding of principle sovereignty is inconsistent with his
previous identification of a Confederation. Because of this tension on the structure of
government which the Constitution creates, it is unclear what Mr. Davis’ true understanding of
principle and derived sovereignty are.
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His Ex. John Hancock
People, Union, Middle
John Hancock was the President of this convention. He speaks only at the end of the
debate, and he states his personal feelings towards the new Constitution and presents the final
Constitution proposed with amendments by the convention. As for his views on principle and
derived sovereignty, he shows an understanding of the people as principle sovereign but does not
really provide any understanding of derived sovereignty, except for his agreeance with the
proposed amendments and his understanding that the people have the right to delegate authority,
but only because of the check that the people will not allow representatives to abuse such a
power as they will not get reelected. He says, “…if amended (as I feel assured it will be)
according to your proposals, cannot fail to give the people of the United States a greater degree
of political freedom, and eventually as much national dignity, as falls to the lot of any nation on
earth” (1475). His only understanding of derived sovereignty as mentioned is giving Congress
the derived power to protect the inalienable rights of the people.
He also discusses the delegation of powers and authority to the general government. He
says, “Were the people of the United States to delegate the powers proposed to be given, to men
who were not dependent on them frequently for elections…the task of delegating authority
would be vastly more difficult; but…the powers reserved by the people render them secure, and,
until they themselves become corrupt, they will always have upright and able rulers.” (1476).
Hancock understands that the ability to be reelected is the main way by which representatives
will not abuse their power, which relates to the amount of derived sovereignty which he thinks is
reasonable to hold in Congress. Since the people are principle sovereign in his understanding,
Congress needs to have the proper ability to protect the people, and Hancock believes that these
powers should be checked by the American people in terms of reelection. This also exhibits his
understanding of the people as principle sovereign because he identifies the people of the United
States as those which should delegate power. This shows his understanding of a union, also, as
he mentions the people of the United States rather than the states themselves or the people of the
states. He has a robust understanding that the people need to be united into one country rather
than thirteen states.
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Hon. Mr. Adams – Boston
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Adams does not address the convention until the near end of the debate. When he
does, he discusses the nature of what might happen if Congress does not have the derived power
it needs to protect the people, as well as providing further arguments on the topics of the quick
passage of the Constitution and the passage of the Constitution with amendments. In his
speeches, Mr. Adams provides a general understanding of his views on principle and derived
sovereignty. He says, “It is essential that the people should be united in the federal government,
to withstand the common enemy, and to preserve their valuable rights and liberties” (1384). This
points to his understanding of the people as principle sovereign awarding the necessary derived
powers to Congress. His use of the word ‘united’ reinforces his understanding of the country
being one people. Mr. Adams highlights that, though many delegates struggled with the question
of derived sovereignty and how much power is too much power, it is necessary to award
Congress the powers by which they can protect the whole country. “…I esteem as highly
valuable, particularly the article which empowers Congress to regulate commerce, to form
treaties, &c” (1384-1385). He agrees that Congress needs to be vested with the power of taxation
because it is for the good of the people as a whole should we fall into a national crisis. He
believes in the derived sovereignty of the general government and wishes to give them the
derived power they need to protect the people from harm. However, he is only willing to provide
derived sovereignty to the degree that the people are still principle and still have the ability to
remove someone from office at a new election should they be failing the people. He continues, “I
have long considered the watchfulness of the people over the conduct of their rulers the strongest
guard against the encroachments of power; and I hope the people of this country will always be
thus watchful” (1395). He applauds the people for their ability to maintain their status as
principle sovereign and remain in control of the representatives which are elected to office by the
people. This shows his commitment to the people as principle sovereign.
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Mr. Jones
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Jones has a distinct understanding of derived sovereignty, but he shows tension in his
understanding of principle sovereignty. He believes in the necessity of derived power to the
general government for the protection of the people, he says on the power of election, “The
power granted to Congress by the 4th section, says he, is a necessary power…” (1219). He
understands the importance of derived sovereignty and is willing to give Congress what he feels
they need in terms of power to protect the people.
However, his discussion of principle sovereignty is not as clear. He says, “The senators
and representatives of this state, Mr. President, are now chosen by a small number of electors;
and it is likely we shall grow equally negligent of our federal elections; or, sir, a state
may refuse to send to Congress its representatives…” (1219). Here he shows an understanding of
a confederacy, where the state governments are sovereign. However, it is still unclear in some
respect because he speaks of “a small number of electors”, without saying who those electors
are, elect the state representatives. The only understanding of explicit principle sovereignty here
is his saying that “a state may refuse to send to Congress its representatives”. He says that it is
the responsibility of the state to send representatives to Congress, not a responsibility of the
people. However, the tension of this understanding arises when he says, “The federal
representatives will represent the people; they will be the people; and it is not probable they will
abuse themselves” (1219). This shows his understanding of the people as principle. It is unclear
what Mr. Jones’ true position on principle sovereignty is, but he can be classified by his
commitment to derived sovereignty, and it can be assumed that he ultimately vested the people
with the power of principle sovereign as this is the only clear account of his understanding.
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Rev. Stillman
People, Union, Strong
Rev. Stillman has a much more robust understanding of derived sovereignty opposed to
principle sovereignty. He believes that it is necessary for Congress to have derived power as this
is what will protect us should there be a national crisis. Also, he highlights that, awarding
Congress more derived power simply puts into place the role of the people as principle. This is
because the people can only give Congress the derived power which they see fit for that body of
government, but also, they are the primary check on the abuse of those powers. If the people
have a problem with a representative, they can take him out of office at the next election.
However, Congress needs to be granted some power so that they can do their job of protecting
the people. He says, “…in order to guard as much as possible against the abuse of those powers
we delegate to government, there ought to be sufficient checks on them; every precaution should
be used to secure the liberties of the people on the one hand, and not render government
inefficient on the other” (1457). He shows the importance of Congress having the power they
need to function properly according to the needs of the people. This is Rev. Stillman’s
understanding of derived sovereignty. So long as powers of Congress can be checked, he
understands them as necessary to the functionality of the general government. He continues,
“The powers that are granted to Congress by this instrument are great and extensive; but, sir,
they are defined and limited, and, in my judgment, sufficiently checked…” (1457). He thinks
that the powers awarded to Congress are distinct and necessary, and it becomes the job of the
people, as principle to check the derived sovereignty of Congress.
Rev. Stillman continues to outline the protected liberties of the people under the
Constitution without the proposed amendments, which would further achieve this goal (14581459). He says regarding frequent elections, “…that power thus frequently reverting to the
people will prove a security to their liberties, and a most important check to the power of the
general government” (1458). His understanding here is that, should the general government as
derived sovereign be abusing their power, the people as principle sovereign can use their power
of election to remove any representative and replace them with someone better suited for the
position. The ultimate and direct power of representation lies in the hands of the people. He
continues, “…that the Constitution provides for the impeachment, trial, and punishment of every
officer in Congress, who shall be guilty of malconduct. With such a prospect, who will dare to
abuse the powers vested in him by the people” (1459)? The people provide the ultimate check on
government because they are principle sovereign. They have the ability to control the nature of
Congress as well as the representatives thereof, as Stillman understands it, so there is almost no
chance of abuse in the derived sovereign.
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Mr. Gore
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Gore is a proponent of the delegation of derived powers to the general government.
He says, “…in the proposed Constitution, the powers of the whole government are limited to
certain national objects, and are accurately defined” (1200). He supports the idea of the general
government having the proper derived powers by which to protect the people. However, he says
that these powers are limited and accurately defined, which speaks to the clarity of the
Constitution. He is okay with this Constitution without the proposed amendments. Mr. Gore can
be categorized here as a strong nationalist based upon his views of derived sovereignty. He
continues on Congress’s proposed derived power of taxation, “Some gentlemen suppose it is
unsafe and unnecessary to vest the proposed government with authority to "lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises. Let us strip the subject of every thing that is foreign, and refrain
from likening it with governments, which, in their nature and administration, have no affinity;
and we shall soon see that it is not only safe, but indispensably necessary to our peace and
dignity, to vest the Congress with the powers described in this section” (1300). Gore understands
the necessity of derived powers, but only is willing to award them to Congress if they are
working for the good of the people and protection thereof. If Congress does not have all of the
derived sovereignty necessary to protect the people, then the government might ultimately fail in
the same way that the Articles did. A lack of strong central power creates vulnerability in the
people, Mr. Gore is looking to prevent this through his understanding of derived sovereignty.
Mr. Gore also believes the people are principle sovereign. He says, “The Senate
represents the sovereignty of the states; the House of Representatives the people of the United
States. The former have a longer term in their office; it is then necessary that that body which
represents the people should have a permanence in their office, to resist any operations of the
Senate, which might be injurious to the people” (1202). This represents his understanding of the
Senate representing the sovereignty of the states. This was the understanding of principle
sovereignty as explained by the Constitution. Mr. Gore is shown here to be in favor of the people
as principle as well as proper term lengths for Congress to ensure that the checks and balances
outlined in the Constitution are executed properly.
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Hon. Mr. Heath
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Heath spoke mainly to his understanding of a union. He does not say much about
derived sovereignty or his beliefs thereof. He is one of the very few to identify himself as a
citizen of the United States rather than of Massachusetts. He says, “I consider myself not as an
inhabitant of Massachusetts, but as a citizen of the United States” (1194). This shows his
commitment to the proposed Constitution as it starts with “We the People”, rather than “We the
States”. This shows his commitment to a union rather than a confederacy as well. He continues,
“Every thing depends on our union. I know that some have supposed, that, although the union
should be broken, particular states may retain their importance; but this cannot be. The strongestnerved state, even the right arm, if separated from the body, must wither. If the great union be
broken, our country, as a nation, perishes…” (1378). Mr. Heath believes in a union. Since a
union is understood to reflect the people as principle sovereign, it is reasonable to conclude that
Mr. Heath also agrees that the people are principle.
Though he does not explicitly speak to who may be principle sovereign, he says, “The
representative is one who appears in behalf of, and acts for, others; he ought, therefore, to be
fully acquainted with the feelings, circumstances, and interests of the persons whom he
represents; and this is learnt among them, not at a distant court” (1194). This shows his
understanding of the proposed Constitution, and though he does not identify who the
representative works on behalf of, he does show his commitment to the Constitution as it is
stated. Since the Constitution describes the people as principle sovereign, it is reasonable to
assume that Mr. Heath agrees with this formulation of principle sovereign. We can use this
understanding of union as supported by this statement to classify Mr. Heath as a proponent for
principle sovereignty.
The only testament to derived sovereignty which Mr. Heath gives is on his account of
slavery. He is one of the very few delegates to discuss this, and it was mainly skipped over. He
writes, “We are not, in this case, partakers of other men's sins; for in nothing do we voluntarily
encourage the slavery of our fellow-men. A restriction is laid on the federal government, which
could not be avoided, and a union take place. The federal Convention went as far as they could.
The migration or importation, &c., is confined to the states now existing only; new states cannot
claim it” (1371). He agrees with the extent of derived sovereignty allotted to the general
government in this question, showing his support for strong derived sovereignty. He thinks that
the general government actually uses its powers perfectly here, as he also reports that he doesn’t
think that the general government should have the power to abolish slavery altogether (1371).
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Judge Sumner
People, Union, Strong
Judge Sumner is a strong proponent for the Constitution, but he does not explicitly speak
to his understanding of principle sovereignty. He thinks that Congress should be awarded the
derived powers which are necessary for the protection of the people, and should those powers be
discouraged from the derived, then Sumner sees no reason to change from the Articles. He says,
“Much better, it appears to me, would it be for the states not to unite under one government,
which will be attended with some expense, than to unite, and at the same time withhold the
powers necessary to accomplish the design of the union” (1298). Judge Sumner can be described
as a strong nationalist in terms of his understanding of derived sovereignty, as well as a supporter
of th union. He continues, “Gentlemen say, the power to raise money may be abused. I grant it;
and the same may be said of any other delegated power” (1298). He understands that abuse is
always a possibility, but the checks of government should deter people from being so deeply
concerned with this, showing his support for strong derived sovereignty. Additionally, the
derived powers vested in Congress through the Constitution are for the protection of the people,
as understood by Judge Sumner, so they are necessary in order to have an effective system of
government for the good of the people.
Through Sumner’s understanding of derived sovereignty and that of a union, it is
reasonable to assume that he believes that the principle are the people. However, since he does
not explain this explicitly, this analysis cannot be confirmed.
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Rev. Thacher
People, Union, Strong
Rev. Thacher speaks to the importance of derived sovereignty and identifies the people as
principle sovereign. He says, “…the situation of the continent when a Constitution was formed,
and the impossibility of preserving a perfect sovereignty in the states, after necessary powers
were ceded to a supreme council of the whole” (1417). This speaks to derived sovereignty, as he
describes that if the necessary derived powers are not vested in Congress, then the whole system
could fail. Thacher agrees that derived powers are necessary, and he speaks to this in terms of
maintaining the good will of the people. He continues, “…there is no man but what would
conceive that a coercive power over the whole, searching through all parts of the system, is
necessary to the preservation and happiness of the whole people” (1418). The derived powers
which Congress holds is for the happiness of the people, as Thacher describes. Since this is the
case, we can classify Thacher as a strong nationalist in terms of his understanding of derived
sovereignty.
Thacher also understands the people as being principle sovereign. He says, “In this
proposed form, each branch of power is derived, either mediately or directly, from the people”
(1418). This shows the people as principle because he understands the Constitution to award the
people the right to elect their representatives as well as state officials, who then elect the
Senators. He continues, “The lower house are elected directly by those persons who are qualified
to vote for the representatives of the state; and, at the expiration of two years, become private
men, unless their past conduct entitles them to a future election. The Senate are elected by the
legislatures of the different states, and represent their sovereignty” (1418-1419). This shows his
commitment to the people as principle because he exhibits an understanding of the people
electing their officials on both the state and national level.
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Mr. Ames
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Ames understands that the people are principle to the derived powers of the general
government. He says, “Much has been said about the people divesting themselves of power,
when they delegate it to representatives; and that all representation is to their disadvantage,
because it is but an image, a copy, fainter and more imperfect than the original, the people, in
whom the light of power is primary and unborrowed, which is only reflected by their delegates. I
cannot agree to either of these opinions” (1190). This shows his commitment to the people as
principle because he shows that delegating powers to the general government for the use of
protection and defense does not change the fact that the people still have ultimate control over
their representatives. He understands the necessity of derived powers for the general government,
and he is okay with delegating these powers to Congress so long as the people remain principle.
He continues, “Faction and enthusiasm are the instruments by which popular governments are
destroyed. We need not talk of the power of an aristocracy. The people, when they lose their
liberties, are cheated out of them” (1192). This further shows his commitment to the people as
principle because he says that rather than aristocracy, a divide in the principle will result in the
people losing their liberties. This is different from what most other delegates who have said who
were worried that Congress would abuse their power. Mr. Ames does not blame Congress for the
potential breach of power, but rather the principle sovereign turning against itself. So long as the
majority is strong, they can discourage any abuse in the derived. However, if they are unstable,
this becomes much more difficult.
This also shows his commitment to derived sovereign where he can be classified as
strong national. He believes that Congress needs derived powers in order to protect the people.
He says, “If gentlemen are willing to confederate, why, he asked, ought not Congress to have the
powers granted by this section? In the Confederation, said Mr. A., the checks are wanting which
are to be found in this Constitution. And the fears of gentlemen that this Constitution will
provide for a permanent aristocracy are therefore ill-founded; for the rulers will always be
dependent on the people, like the insects of a sunshiny day, and may, by the breath of their
displeasure, be annihilated” (1352). This shows his belief in derived sovereignty and awarding
the general government the necessary powers to protect the people. Without these powers, they
cannot protect the people. But, furthermore, this also exhibits his understanding of a union
structure of government.

- 98 -

Mr. Cabot
People, Union, Middle
Mr. Cabot has a robust understanding of the people as principle, but he does not really
identify his feelings on derived sovereignty except in terms of election rates. He says,
…if the state legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively the
elections of the democratic branch, they may, by such an interference, first
weaken, and at last destroy, that check, they may at first diminish, and
finally annihilate, that control of the general government, which the people
ought always to have through their immediate representatives. As one of
the people… in my mind, the 4th section is to be as highly prized as any in
the Constitution. (1217).
Mr. Cabot does not like the idea of the government controlling elections. He fears that this will
jeopardize the principle sovereignty of the people because the state governments would have too
much derived power. Here, Mr. Cabot seems to be explaining a system of derived government
where the people are principle, and both the state and national governments are derived, but the
national government also derives powers from the state. Mr. Cabot is worried about there being
insufficient checks on government, but he agrees with the notion of delegating necessary powers
to Congress for the protection of the people as principle. He identifies the people as principle in
the above statement as well, and he identifies himself as one of the people, showing his
commitment to popular sovereignty.
Mr. Cabot further develops his understanding of principle sovereignty residing with the
people through his understanding of representation. He shows his commitment to equal
representation and the importance of laying out a well-organized and people-oriented
government. He says, “…that a free and equal representation is the best, if not the only
foundation upon which a free government can be built; and, consequently, that the greatest care
should be taken in laying it” (1216). This shows his understanding of a union, which further
solidifies his belief in the people as principle.
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Mr. Choate
People, Union, Strong
Mr. Choate speaks to his understanding of derived sovereignty, but he does not explicitly
state his understanding of principle sovereignty. On Article 1 Section 8, he says, “And this can
be no other than an unlimited power of taxation, if that defence requires it. Mr. C. contended that
it was the power of the people concentred to a point; that, as all power is lodged in them, this
power ought to be supreme” (1316). Mr. Choate is in favor of vesting the complete power of
taxation in the hands of the general government. When he speaks to the power supreme, he is
referring to the power of taxation. He agrees with derived sovereignty, and he is arguably one of
the strongest advocates for this sovereignty. He says that this power of direct taxation in
Congress is necessary for them to be the supreme power of the country. However, it is possible
that he does not mean that Congress should be the supreme power, but rather the supreme
derived sovereign who still have to answer to the people as principle. Mr. Choate does not
explicitly state his understanding here, but this is a reasonable consideration to draw given his
commitment to derived sovereignty as it lines up with other delegates who have similar views on
the principle-agent relationship.
Mr. Choate also has an understanding of a union. He says, “After adverting to the idea of
some, of its being a consolidation of the Union, Mr. Choate concluded by a brief display of the
several checks contained, and securities for the people to be found, in this system” (1316). Mr.
Choate understands that this union is created through the new Constitution, and the people
should be in support of it because it provides securities and checks for the people. This does not
explicitly speak to his understanding of principle sovereignty, but rather the security of the
people as this was a major concern during the Convention. However, it is reasonable to assume
that this does show his understanding of the people as principle given the understanding of a
union as recorded in the debate and among other delegates.
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Mr. Symmes
Peoplem Union, Strong
Mr. Symmes was mainly concerned with the question of derived sovereignty to the
general government. However, he does talk about principle sovereignty briefly, saying, “…I
could have wished for a more effectual, and, if I may term it so, a more feeling representation in
the Lower House, and for a representation of the people in the Senate. I have been, and still am,
desirous of a rotation in office, to prevent the final perpetuation of power in the same men…”
(1307). This shows his commitment to the people as principle because he already contends to the
people electing their representatives, and he says he would like to see the same thing in the
Senate. He is the first of the delegates to question the state legislature election of Senators,
showing his understanding of the people as principle. He also discusses the role of the majority
and how the people are in control of the government, so if power is abused, the responsibility
thereof ultimately falls to the people. He says, “From this it would follow that no public measure
was ever wrong, because it must have been passed by the majority; and so, I grant, no power
ever was, or ever will be, abused” (1309). As he sees it, if the majority is in control (principle),
then the government cannot abuse their power because the majority has the internal check of
reelection.
Mr. Symmes played devil’s advocate to create a robust argument in favor of Article 1
Section 8. He says, “No, sir; my constituents wish for a firm, efficient Continental government,
but fear the operation of this which is now proposed. Let them be convinced that their fears are
groundless, and I venture to declare in their name, that no town in the commonwealth will sooner
approve the form, or be better subjects under it” (1311). He identifies the arguments against the
proposed section and rejects them all in order to establish the necessity for this. Along with his
argument that the majority will maintain the morality of government, he also shows here the
necessity of derived sovereignty in Congress for the good of the people. Mr. Symmes is a strong
nationalist in terms of derived sovereignty.
Mr. Symmes also speaks to amendments. He does not believe that they are necessary, but
is in favor of passing the Constitution with them in order to appease the minds of other delegates.
He says, “Shall we, then, totally reject the Constitution, because we are only morally certain that
they will be adopted? Shall we choose certain misery in one way, when we have the best human
prospect of enjoying our most sanguine wishes in another? God forbid” (1474)! He understands
that the Constitution works for the good of the people, and, though it may have some faults, it is
the best form of government for the country because of its basis in popular sovereignty.
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Gen. Brooks – Medford
People, Union, Strong
Gen. Brooks speaks only to principle sovereignty in terms of derived sovereignty. He
says, “…when that power is given, with proper checks, the danger is at an end. When men are
answerable, and within the reach of responsibility, they cannot forget that their political
existence depends upon their good behavior” (1255). He does not say whether he agrees with the
notion of these derived powers, but we can infer that he is in favor given his understanding that
checks and balances are enough to regulate a potential abuse of power. This also shows his
commitment to the people as principle because they have the ability to hold representatives
accountable, and they have the power to remove them from office should they not be working for
the will of the people. He continues, “If that conduct excites suspicion, they are to be impeached,
punished, (or prevented from holding any office, which is great punishment.) If these checks are
not sufficient, it is impossible to devise such as will be so” (1255). This shows the powers of the
principle (the people) to control their representatives. This also shows his commitment to derived
sovereignty because, though he does not explicitly express his feelings towards the concept, his
understanding that the people will always remain in control to reject tyrannical government is
enough to grant such powers to Congress.
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Mr. Bodman
Weak
Mr. Bodman spoke exclusively to derived sovereignty. Bodman voted against the
Constitution, and he did not believe in the necessity of Congress to be vested with the powers
provided in Article 1 Section 8. He says, “…the power given to Congress, to lay and collect
duties, taxes, &c., as contained in the section under consideration, was certainly unlimited, and
therefore dangerous; and wished to know whether it was necessary to give Congress power to do
harm, in order to enable them to do good” (1290). He did not have an understanding that the
checks of the principle (the people) would be sufficient in preventing an aristocracy in
government. He continues, “…but if Congress has the power to lay taxes, and, in cases of
negligence or non-compliance, can send a power to collect them, he thought that the idea of
sovereignty was destroyed” (1290). Bodman thought that this was too much derived sovereignty
in the hands of the general government. He expected a breach of power and did not see the
necessity of Congress having the direct power of taxation.
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Hon. Mr. Turner
People, Union, Middle
Mr. Turner is a skeptic of derived sovereignty and having too much power vested in
Congress. He says, “But I do not wish to give Congress a power which they can abuse; and I
wish to know whether such a power is not contained in this section? I think it is” (1224). Turner
is worried that Congress will abuse their power, and so does not want to give them too much
derived sovereignty. He continues, “Therefore, instead of giving Congress powers they may not
abuse, we ought to withhold our hands from granting such as must be abused if exercised”
(1226). This shows his skepticism for a breach of power, and his refusal to vest many powers in
the hands of Congress. Though he does understand the necessity of Congress having certain
powers, he does not think that the power of direct taxation should be included. He states, “…for
by small degrees has liberty, in all nations, been wrested from the hands of the people. I know
great powers are necessary to be given to Congress, but I wish they may be well guarded”
(1226). He does not think that there are sufficient checks of the derived sovereign, so he is
against vesting them with this power of taxation. He can be classified as “strong states” in terms
of his understanding of derived sovereignty.
When amendments are introduced to the Constitution, Mr. Turner is swayed to vote in
favor. He says, “I have been averse to the reception of this Constitution, while it was considered
merely in its original form; but since the honorable Convention have pleased to agree to the
recommendation of certain amendments, I acknowledge my mind is reconciled” (109). He still
has issues with the Constitution, but these amendments are enough for him to vote to ratify as
they reconcile some of his concerns for the liberties of the people.
Mr. Turner does not really discuss his understanding principle sovereignty, but he does
express his understanding that a union form of government is necessary. He says, “The minds of
gentlemen, throughout the nation, must be impressed with such a sense of the necessity of allimportant union, especially in our present circumstances, as must strongly operate in favor of a
concurrence” (1472). This shows his understanding of the Constitution representing the
American people and not the states. Based on the previously stated understanding of union, that
the people are principle, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Turner also has this understanding.
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Hon. Mr. White
Weak
Mr. White speaks solely to his understanding of derived sovereignty. In this
understanding, Congress should not be vested with powers which could lead to abuse. He says,
“…he was opposed to the section; he thought the security of the people lay in frequent elections;
for his part, he would rather they should be for six months than for two years…” (5). White does
not agree that Congress should have infrequent elections as this could jeopardize the security of
the people. This speaks to his understanding of derived sovereignty, where he can be classified in
the “strong states” camp. He continues, “…in giving this power, we give up every thing; and
Congress, with the purse-strings in their hands, will use the sword with a witness” (1287). This is
White’s analysis of Congress having the power of direct taxation. He is against this idea, and
thinks that this will only lead to abuse of the government.
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Rev. Mr. West
People, Strong
Mr. West speaks only briefly in the Convention, but he speaks enough and on the topic of
sovereignty to be classified in terms of his beliefs. He says, “Is it probable that we shall choose
men to ruin us? Are we to object to all governments? and because power may be abused, shall
we be reduced to anarchy and a state of nature? What hinders our state legislatures from abusing
their powers? They may violate the Constitution; they may levy taxes oppressive and intolerable,
to the amount of all our property” (1227). Mr. West believes that derived powers should be
granted to the general government. He is not worried about abuse of power because, as he states,
we elect the governments. While he does not state who exactly “we” are, it is reasonable to
assume he is speaking of the people as his argument in favor of derived sovereignty is consistent
with other delegates who also have an understanding of the people as principle sovereign.
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Mr. Barrell
Middle
Mr. Barrell speaks to his concerns with the Constitution, but ultimately states that he is in
favor of ratification with or without amendments. On the topic of derived sovereignty, he says,
“Congress will be vested with more extensive powers than ever Great Britain exercised over us;
too great, in my opinion, to intrust with any class of men…while we consider them as men of
like passions, the same spontaneous, inherent thirst for power with ourselves, great and good as
they may be, when they enter upon this all-important charge, what security can we have that they
will continue so” (1448)? Mr. Barrell is concerned that Congress could abuse their power should
they be awarded so much derived sovereignty. He can be classified in the “strong states” camp in
terms of derived sovereignty. However, despite his concerns of aristocracy, Mr. Barrell is still in
favor of the Constitution as it stands. He does not expressly speak to the checks and balances
which would prevent this breach of power in Congress, but he does understand the role of the
government to be for protection of the people. He says, “…I think it becomes us, as wise men, as
the faithful guardians of the people's rights, and as we wish well to posterity, to propose such
amendments as will secure to us and ours that liberty without which life is a burden” (1449). The
ultimate goal is to protect the rights of the people, as Mr. Barrell understands. This shows his
commitment to popular sovereignty.
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Mr. Nason
State Governments. Confederacy, Weak
Mr. Nason is against awarding Congress extensive derived sovereignty. He is so focused
on the liberty of the people and has an understanding that the Constitution will infringe upon
this. He says, “I beg the indulgence of this honorable body to permit me to make a short
apostrophe to Liberty. O Liberty! thou greatest good! thou fairest property! with thee I wish to
live — with thee I wish to die! Pardon me if I drop a tear on the peril to which she is exposed; I
cannot, sir, see this brightest of jewels tarnished…” (1397). Nason does not think that
government will work to protect the liberties of the people, but rather that the Constitution gives
them the means to undermine these liberties.
Mr. Nason also believes that the government should be a confederacy rather than a union,
and he therefore identifies the principle as being the state governments. He states, “We are under
oath: we have sworn that Massachusetts is a sovereign and independent state. How, then, can we
vote for this Constitution, that destroys that sovereignty” (1397)? He speaks to the state as the
sovereign and the delegates of the state as voting for ratification. Here, he provides a robust
understanding of the state governments as principle sovereign.
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Mr. Singletary
Weak
Mr. Singletary does not think that Congress should be given many derived powers.
Regarding the derived powers of Congress, he says, “…does not this Constitution do the same?
Does it not take away all we have — all our property? Does it not lay all taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises? And what more have we to give” (1345)? Singletary is fearful that Congress will
take the meager citizens for everything they have. He does not understand the checks and
balances associated with representation, and so he thinks that Congress is going to become a
power-ridden aristocracy. Singletary is trying to protect the common person, and so he does not
agree with the derived power of Congress of direct taxation.
Mr. Singletary is worried that the representation of Congress will be a means of
undermining people who are not as successful as the representatives are. He says, “These
lawyers, and men of learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so
smoothly, to make us poor illiterate people swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress
themselves; they expect to be the managers of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the
money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks…” (1345). This
further shows Singletary’s objection to derived sovereignty providing Congress the power of
taxation. Singletary has a deep-set fear of tyranny. He does, however, make huge assumptions
here as to what will happen in Congress, and arguably this is because he is not very well
educated himself and simply cannot understand what the Constitution, or delegates to the
Convention, are truly talking about. Singletary is very concerned with the status of the lesseducated. This shows that he may identify with them in terms of his confusion surrounding this
debate. Should this be the case, the classification of Singletary could be compromised because
we cannot get an accurate understanding of his feelings based upon the barrier of language.
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Capt. Snow
People, Union, Strong
Capt. Snow is in favor of Congress having the delegated power of taxation. He says, “It
has been said, Mr. President, that there is too much power delegated to Congress by the section
under consideration. I doubt it; I think power the hinge on which the whole Constitution turns”
(14). He continues to discuss the necessity of Congress to have such power in order to protect the
people.
He also understands the people as principle. He states, “…as the man is accountable for
his conduct, I think there is no danger” (1228). His understanding of the man (representatives)
being accountable for their actions indicates an understanding of the people as principle because
they will remove a representative who is not accountable for his actions. This also presupposes
his understanding of a union as it is consistent to have this align with the people as principle.
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Appendix 2: Virginia Vignettes
Mr. Pendleton
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Pendleton is the first delegate to speak at the Virginia State Ratifying Convention,
and he was the president of this convention. He spoke largely to his concern of the citizens. His
top priority was the citizens and their protection. He says, “This Constitution was transmitted to
Congress by that convention; by the Congress transmitted to our legislature; by them
recommended to the people; the people have sent us hither to determine whether this government
be a proper one or not” (6). Mr. Pendleton speaks to the necessity of the people to approve of this
government. He speaks to the delegates solely as keepers of the public good, and he works to
support that as best as possible through his record of the debate.
Mr. Pendleton largely disagrees with the ideas of Patrick Henry in terms of principle
sovereignty. He says, when speaking against Mr. Henry, “We, the people, is thought improper.
Permit me to ask the gentleman who made this objection, who but the people can delegate
powers? Who but the people have a right to form government” (37)? This shows his support for
the people as principle sovereign. The people should choose the delegation of powers, as he
explains, so the people are the principle sovereign.
With regard to the Union/Confederacy distinction, Mr. Pendleton supports a union. He
says, “If the objection be, that the Union ought to be not of the people, but of the state
governments, then I think the choice of the former very happy and proper. What have the state
governments to do with it” (37)? Mr. Pendleton supports a union, and further expresses his
understanding of the people as principle.
Mr. Pendleton supports strong derived sovereignty. He says, “Government must then
have its complete powers, or be ineffectual; a legislature to fix rules, impose sanctions, and point
out the punishment of the transgressors of these rules; and executive to watch over officers, and
bring them to punishment; a judiciary, to guard the innocent, and fix the guilty, by a fair trial”
(39). Mr. Pendleton speaks up again in regard to derived sovereignty when Section 8 is
introduced to the convention. He says, “This exclusive power is limited to that place solely, for
their own preservation, which all gentlemen allow to be necessary” (440). Mr. Pendleton likes
Section 8 and doesn’t think that it should be altered.
Mr. Pendleton falls silent for much of the debate. He is silent from page 39-292, not
returning until the defense tries to commit back to a Confederation, where he speaks up in favor
of the union (293). Additionally, he discusses representation and how he finds this to be
representative of the people (299).
He speaks back up towards the end of the debate, speaking to his understanding of the
necessity of a judiciary (517-522). He continues, “When the Constitution says that the trial shall
be by jury, does it not say that every incident will go along with it? I think the honorable
gentleman was mistaken yesterday in his reasoning on the propriety of a jury from the vicinage”
(546). He says this when speaking to his understanding that criminal cases would be included
under Art. 3. He continues, “Trial by jury is secured by this system in criminal cases, as are all
the incidental circumstances relative to it. The honorable gentleman yesterday made an objection
to that clause which says that the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such
inferior courts as Congress may ordain and establish” (547). Mr. Pendleton agrees with the
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Article at hand and thinks that it is sufficient in its checks and protection of the people. With
regard to the principle sovereign of the judiciary, he says, “Of the two objects of judicial
cognizance, one is general and national, and the other local. The former is given to the general
judiciary, and the latter left for the local tribunals” (548). He understands the separation between
the states and federal governments when speaking to the roles of the judiciary. He thinks that this
separation is necessary, but also already properly identified in the language of the Constitution.
He also disagrees with the proposed amendments of Mr. Mason.

- 112 -

Mr. Wilson Nicholas
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Nicholas begins his first speech of the convention with discussion of Article 1
Section 2 regarding the qualification of electors. He says, “A qualification that gives a right to
elect representatives for the state legislatures, gives also, by this Constitution, a right to choose
representatives for the general government” (8). This shows Mr. Nicholas’ commitment to the
people as principle because he understands them to elect both their state representatives and their
federal representatives, and he has no problem with this. This is further proven with his
understanding of the people choosing their representatives as being consistent with the will of the
people and not breaching their liberty. He says, “The possible abuse here complained of never
can happen as long as the people of the United States are virtuous” (10). Since the people can
control who gets put into government, they are principle.
When speaking to derived sovereignty, Mr. Nicholas says, “...they first suppose that
Congress, from a love of power natural to all, will, in general, abuse that with which they are
invested; and then they would make us apprehend that the House of Representatives,
notwithstanding their love of power, (and it must be supposed as great in a branch of Congress as
in the whole,) will give out of their hands the only check which can insure to them the
continuance of the participation of the powers lodged in Congress in general” (13). He says this
when speaking to the number of representatives who should be in office, but explains that this
ultimately doesn’t matter, so long as the people are happy with their choices for representation,
that’s the most important aspect to this government. Mr. Nicholas continues on the topic of
derived sovereignty later in the convention. He gets into a bit of an argument with Mr. Henry as
well as Mr. Grayson over Section 8. He says, “We must either empower them to employ, and
rely altogether on, a standing army; or depend altogether on militia; or else we must enable them
to use the one or the other of these two ways, as may be found most expedient” (389). Mr.
Nicholas then continues to argue against the use of standing armies because they are ineffective
and could jeopardize the American country (389).
Regarding Art. 2, he says, “The worthy member says the weight of power ought to be in
this part of the continent, because the number of inhabitants will be greater here. If so, every
freeholder having a right to vote for the President, by the interposition of electors, will attend to
his interests. This is a sufficient check” (502). He has the same defense for the President as he
does Representatives: since the people elect them, the elected officials have to respond to their
desires or else be removed from office.
Mr. Nicholas also argues in favor of a union, saying, “The most valuable right of a part of
the community has been invaded. By whom? By Congress, under the existing system, -- the
worthy member’s favorite Confederation. Is this an argument to continue that Confederation?
Does it not prove that that Confederation is not sufficient for the purposes for which it was
instituted” (356)? Here, he is speaking against Mr. Henry with regard to his arguments in favor
of a Confederation.
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Mr. George Nicholas
Union, People, Strong
Mr. George Nicholas is in favor of ratification of the Constitution. He says, “…if this
Constitution be adopted, the western countries will be lost. It is better that a few countries should
be lost, than all America. But, sir, no such consequence can follow from its adoption. They will
be much more secure than they are at present” (237). Further, he expresses his commitment to
the union, “He tells us that our present government is strong. How can that government be strong
which depends on humble supplications for its support? Does a government which is dependent
for its existence on others, and which is unable to afford protection to the people, deserve to be
continued” (237)? Here he shows the inherent flaws in the Articles and why the switch to a union
is necessary.
When speaking to derived sovereignty, Mr. Nicholas says, “There are many strong
reasons to expect that the adoption of this system will be beneficial to the back country, and that
their interest will be much better attended to under the new than under the old government”
(239). He says this when the conversation turns to exploration of the Mississippi and Sec. 8 of
the Constitution regarding treaties. Mr. Nicholas thinks that the best way to address this
exploration is through the union, and through the derived power of Congress. To this end, Mr.
Nicholas supports strong derived sovereignty. He continues, again speaking to Sec. 8, “The first
clause gives the general government power to call them out when necessary. Does this take it
away from the states? No. But it gives an additional security; for, besides the power in the state
governments to use their own militia, it will be the duty of the general government to aid them
with the strength of the Union when called for” (427). Mr. Nicholas points out that the purpose
of this clause is to force the states and the general government to work together. So, he’s okay
with the grant of power provided. He does, however, agree with the continuance of the slave
trade, but only so that the Southern states would be willing to join the union (456). He is also
okay with Sec. 10, saying, “This clause does not hinder them from doing it, because the state
never could do it; the jurisdiction of such general objects being exclusively vested in Congress”
(476). Here, he is speaking to ex post facto laws and the Continental debt. He thinks that this
should be a general government concern rather than a state concern. With regard to Article 3, he
speaks against the understanding of Mr. Henry, showing his commitment to the article at hand
(580-581).
He supports the people as principle sovereign. He says, “…the people retain what is not
conferred on the general government, as it is by their positive grant that it has any of its powers”
(246). The government only holds powers based on what the people are willing to grant to it,
proving the understanding of the people as principle sovereign. Further, he adds, “The people
have depended on their representatives. They will not consent to pass an act to infringe it,
because such an act would irritate the nation” (247). The people will choose proper
representatives to the general government because that is their only connection to their
government.
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Mr. Henry
Confederacy, State Governments, Weak
Mr. Henry is very outspoken against the Constitution. He says, “That this is a
consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my
mind, very striking” (22). Mr. Henry detests the Constitution at hand and wants to go back to the
confederation. He continues, “Who authorized them to speak the language of, We, the people,
instead of, We, the states? States are the characteristics and the soul of a confederation. If the
states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great, consolidated, national government,
of the people of all the states” (22). He strongly disapproves of the union. He also speaks rather
ill of the delegates who do support the Constitution, because he thinks that this implies that
they’re working against the will of the people and putting their liberties at danger.
When speaking to derived sovereignty, Mr. Henry says, “You are told there is no peace,
although you fondly flatter yourselves that all is peace; no peace; a general cry and alarm in the
country; commerce, riches, and wealth, vanished; citizens going to seek comforts in other parts
or the world; laws insulted; many instances of tyrannical legislation. These things, sir, are new to
me. He has made the discovery. As to the administration of justice, I believe that failures in
commerce, &c., cannot be attributed to it” (139). Henry points out the sort of hypocrisy of the
people on the other side. They seem to be arguing for peace and liberty of the people, but as he
sees it, the union directly undermines this because it violates these things. He is not in favor of
anything regarding the Constitution, and battles everything proposed within it. He and Mr.
Madison go back and forth arguing over the language of the Constitution and what it implies.
However, most of his speeches consist of him rambling about the necessity of the Confederacy
and the abuse of the Constitution. He is the first delegate, however, to speak about the necessity
of a Bill of Rights. The convention reports, “Mr. Henry then declared a bill of rights
indispensably necessary; that a general positive provision should be inserted in the new system,
securing to the states and the people every right which was not conceded to the general
government…” (150). The only way that Mr. Henry thought that the Constitution would be even
remotely okay, though he still wouldn’t ratify, is if it included a Bill of Rights. In his
understanding, this is the only way to secure the liberties of the people.
Regarding principle sovereignty, he says, “It will destroy the state governments, and
swallow the liberties of the people, without giving previous notice” (156). He thinks that the only
way to effectively secure the rights of the people is through a confederacy, so he views the states
as principle. To this end, he also doesn’t agree with the ratification of government. He continues,
“Notwithstanding two of their provinces have paid nothing, yet I hope the example of Holland
will tell us that we can live happily without changing our present despised government Cannot
people be as happy under a mild as under an energetic government” (160-161). He thinks that the
call for a new energetic government is unreasonable and uncalled for. Mr. Henry thinks that
these things are already founded in the Confederacy. He would rather remain with this
government.
When the debate was discussing the powers of Congress, Mr. Henry said, “I cannot
understand the implication of the honorable gentleman, that, because Congress may arm the
militia, the states cannot do it: nor do I understand the reverse of the proposition. The states are,
by no part of the plan before you, precluded from arming and disciplining the militia, should
Congress neglect it” (178). He has a lot of issues with Article 1, and he doesn’t like the amount
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of derived sovereignty that Congress will now hold. He falls silent for some of the debate,
following his series of day-long speeches. But, every time he does speak, it is against the
Constitution. He thinks that the representatives will work against the will of the people, saying,
“They are bound by honor and conscience to act with integrity, but they are under no
constitutional restraint” (316). According to Mr. Henry, the representatives to the general
government cannot be trusted because they have no Constitutional obligation to maintain the will
of the people. To him, this is the most important aspect of governance.
When the question of exploring the Mississippi River comes to discussion, Mr. Henry
says, “If Congress should, for a base purpose, give away this dearest right of the people, your
western brethren will be ruined. We ought to secure to them that navigation which is necessary
to their very existence” (352). He thinks that the exploration of the country should be left to the
states, and not the general government. He thinks that if the general government has this kind of
ability, they will use it to undermine the American people to work for the national interest rather
than their personal interest. He also doesn’t agree with Sec. 6, saying, “some other gentleman
would have objected to this part. The pay of the members is, by the Constitution, to be fixed by
themselves, without limitation or restraint. They may therefore indulge themselves in the fullest
extent” (368). Mr. Henry thinks that Congress’ ability to choose their own wages is absolutely
absurd. With this, they are quite literally allowed to steal from the American people through the
language of the Constitution. This is completely ridiculous to Mr. Henry. Though, he finds most
everything to be ridiculous which regards this Constitution. He continues, “This theoretic
inconvenience of leaving to Congress the fixing their compensations is more than
counterbalanced by this in the Confederation — that the state legislatures had a right to
determine the pay of the members of Congress, which enabled the states to destroy the general
government” (370-371). When the conversation turned to the control over the militia, he says, “If
the states have the right of arming them, &c., concurrently, Congress has a concurrent power of
appointing the officers, and training the militia. If Congress have that power, it is absurd” (386).
He thinks that Congress holding all of these enormous powers is incredibly abusive, and he
speaks against all of Art. 1.
As the debate continues, the scope moves from Article 1 to the concept of a Bill of Rights
as well as the other Articles. He says, “…the necessity of a bill of rights appears to me to be
greater in this government than ever it was in any government before” (445). He is in strong
support of the Bill of Rights because he sees this as the only way to secure the individual
liberties necessary to the American people. When speaking to the role of the Executive, he says,
“…gentlemen say that the king of Great Britain has the same right of making treaties that our
President has here. I will have no objection to this, if you make your president a king” (502). He
argues that the role of this President is very different from the British King in terms of treaties
because the President is much more powerful than the King. He continues, “When you
yourselves have your necks so low that the President may dispose of your rights as he pleases,
the law of nations cannot be applied to relieve you. Sure I am, if treaties are made infringing our
liberties, it will be too late to say that our constitutional rights are violated” (503). The President,
to him, is just as abusive as Congress is.
Speaking to Art. 3, he says, “…there is to be a trial by the jury in the state where the fact
was committed; but, sir, this state, for instance, is so large that your juries may be collected five
hundred miles from where the party resides — no neighbors who are acquainted with their
characters, their good or bad conduct in life, to judge of the unfortunate man who may be thus
exposed to the rigor of that government” (578-579). The judicial system as set up by the
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Constitution does not provide enough protection to the American people. The juries provided can
be from different states and cultural backgrounds, and as Mr. Henry views it, that works against
the defense. This abuse should be unconstitutional, and he thinks it should be changed.
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Governor Randolph
Union, People, Strong
Governor Randolph opens by expressing his desire for a union. He says, “I will assent to
the lopping of this limb, (meaning his arm,) before I assent to the dissolution of the Union” (2526). Gov. Randolph is very vocal about his dislike for the current Confederate state, working to
argue against Mr. Henry in that arena.
He continues to speak to his understanding of the people as principle sovereign. He says,
“The government is for the people; and the misfortune was, that the people had no agency in the
government before” (28). Randolph likes the change in government with a more central focus on
the will of the people. This shows his understanding of the people as principle. He continues, “If
the government is to be binding on the people, are not the people the proper persons to examine
its merits or defects” (29)? He strongly believes that the people are at the center of government,
and he likes the Constitution because it highlights and promotes that idea much more than that of
the Articles.
In terms of derived sovereignty, Randolph holds a strong understanding. He says that this
convention should adopt the Constitution “...because it secures the liberty of the citizen, his
person and property, and will invigorate and restore commerce and industry” (67). Since he is in
favor of ratification as the Constitution currently stood, as he explains, he is, by default, a
supporter of strong derived sovereignty since this is already accounted for in the Constitution.
This understanding is strengthened with the introduction of Section 8. With this regard,
Randolph says, “IF the mere pleasure of individuals were alone to be consulted, if it were left to
the choice of your people to pay it or not, your treasury would be much poorer than it is; and the
advocates of this pernicious policy would perhaps be ashamed of their pertinacity” (115). Gov.
Randolph supports the ratification of the Constitution, as well as the large grant of power to
Congress. When speaking to Article 2, he says, “That which has produced my opinion against
the limitation of his eligibility is this — that it renders him more independent in his place, and
more solicitous of promoting the interest of his constituents; for, unless you put it in his power to
be reelected, instead of being attentive to their interests, he will lean to the augmentation of his
private emoluments” (485-486). Gov. Randolph doesn’t agree that the President should have
limitations for eligibility. As he sees it, this excludes many possibly great candidates, and he
thinks that that serves an injustice to the people.
Speaking to Article 3, he says, “Every government necessarily involves a judiciary as a
constituent part. If, then, a federal judiciary be necessary, what are the characters of its powers?
That it shall be auxiliary to the federal government, support and maintain harmony between the
United States and foreign powers, and between different states, and prevent a failure of justice in
cases to which particular state courts are incompetent.” (570). This is how Gov. Randolph views
the role of the judiciary. He is also speaking in favor of the article at hand. He continues,
“Disputes between them ought, therefore to be decided by the federal judiciary. Give me leave to
state some instances which have actually happened, which prove to me the necessity of the
power of deciding controversies between two or more states” (571). He then goes into his
examples of states, but this shows his agreeance with Article 3.
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Mr. George Mason
Union, People of the State, Weak
Mr. Mason is a very prevalent voice in these debates. He holds a different understanding
of sovereignty than most of the other delegates, because he operationalizes principle sovereignty
within the people of the state rather than the people of the country. However, to make matters
even more unusual, he also has an understanding of a union form of government. This is
established when he says, “These two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one will
destroy the other: the general government being paramount to, and in every respect more
powerful than the state governments, the latter must give way to the former” (29-30). This shows
Mason’s understanding that the union, though challenging and new, is the correct form of
government for America. He does have concerns regarding his commitment to the union, as it is
problematic in the nature of changing governments. He says, “I solemnly declare that no man is a
greater friend to a firm union of the American states than I am; but, sir, if this great end can be
obtained without hazarding the rights of the people, why should we recur to such dangerous
principles” (30)? He likes the idea of the union, but he’s worried about how it will stand up in
practice. As the debate progresses, he starts to change his tune to be more in favor of the state
governments serving as principle sovereign. He says, “To those who think that one national,
consolidated government is best for America, this extensive judicial authority will be agreeable;
but I hope there are many in this Convention of a different opinion, and who see their political
happiness resting on their state governments. I know, from my own knowledge, many worthy
gentlemen of the former opinion” (522). He thinks that the only proper form of the judiciary
should be one which is controlled by the state governments and not the general government.
Then, when asked by Mr. Madison to elaborate on who these people may be, he refused to
explain himself (523). He did, however, give an extensive speech on the abuses of the judiciary.
Continuing, “Thus, sir, said Mr. Mason, after limiting the cases in which the federal judiciary
could interpose, I would confine the appellate jurisdiction to matters of law only, in common-law
controversies” (525). He wants to greatly limit the role of the federal judiciary and instead make
the states the primary principle for the judiciary. Though this would stray from his understanding
of the people of the states as principle, it does not really affect this understanding because the
judiciary does not have any jurisdiction over the people directly, they simply make decisions
about the law. To this end, it does not really matter who the principle sovereign of the judiciary
is, but it is much more relevant who the principle of the general government is, in his
understanding. He also proposes this, “’that the judicial power shall extend to no case where the
cause of action shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitution, except in suits
for debts due to the United States, disputes between states about their territory, and disputes
between persons claiming lands under grants of different states.’ In these cases, there is an
obvious necessity for giving it a retrospective power” (530). He wants the federal judiciary to be
limited with the remaining powers given to the states, with the exception of the cases of the
national debt.
To this end, Mr. Mason is in favor of a union which has weak derived sovereignty. He
likes the idea of the states being united, but he is concerned that a general government of that
magnitude will become abusive. So, he suggests that the people of the states should be principle
to protect the general government from becoming too powerful. He says, “If we give the general
government the power of demanding their quotas of the states, with an alternative of laying
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direct taxes in case of non-compliance, then the mischief would be avoided; and the certainty of
this conditional power would, in all human probability, prevent the application, and the sums
necessary for the Union would be then laid by the states, by those who know how it can best be
raised, by those who have a fellow-feeling for us” (31). Mr. Mason sympathizes with the position
of the state, and he tries to form a hybrid principle sovereign which combines a union and
confederacy. This makes him feel more secure with the grant of power to the general
government, as some will be retained back to the states, and it protects the will of the people, as
Mr. Mason understands it. He is, however, okay with Sec. 10. He says, “The clause which has
been read, as a sufficient security, seemed to him to be satisfactory as far as it went; that is, that
the Continental money ought to stand on the same ground as it did previously, or that the claim
should not be impaired” (472). He is okay with Sec. 10 so long as the power remains limited to
some extent.
In the continuation of the debate, Mr. Mason becomes much more vocal. He often sides
with the ideas of Mr. Henry, though only to an extent. He agrees with the need for a Bill of
Rights (266). Additionally, he calls for the rejection of Section 8, as this is abusive (378), and
discusses the implications of slavery on the general government. He says, “As much as I value a
union of all the states, I would not admit the Southern States into the Union unless they agree to
the discontinuance of this disgraceful trade, because it would bring weakness, and not strength,
to the Union” (452). Mr. Mason does not agree with the existence or persistence of the Southern
slave trade, and he thinks they should be excluded from the Union until they resolve this tension.
He does have a problem with Article 2, however, saying, “Nothing is so essential to the
preservation of a republican government as a periodical rotation. Nothing so strongly impels a
man to regard the interest of his constituents as the certainty of returning to the general mass of
the people, from whence he was taken, where he must participate their burdens” (485). Mr.
Mason insists on the President’s necessity of periodical rotation, meaning that they shouldn’t be
able to serve two consecutive terms. He says this is necessary because without it, the President
will be less connected to the desires of the people. He continues saying that he, “contended that
this mode of election was a mere deception, — a mere ignis fatuus on the American people, —
and thrown out to make them believe they were to choose him; whereas it would not be once out
of fifty times that he would be chosen by them in the first instance, because a majority of the
whole number of votes was required” (492). He doesn’t like the role of the electoral college
because he thinks that it is deceptive to the American people. He thinks that the popular vote
should be the deciding factor of the Presidential elections. He reportedly was, “animadverting on
the magnitude of the powers of the President, was alarmed at the additional power of
commanding the army in person. He admitted the propriety of his being commander-in-chief, so
far as to give orders and have a general superintendency; but he thought it would be dangerous to
let him command in person, without any restraint, as he might make a bad use of it” (496).
Beyond disliking the principality of the executive, Mr. Mason also disagrees with the derived
powers which the President is prescribed to hold.
Regarding Art. 3, he says, “After having read the first section, Mr. Mason asked, What is
there left to the state courts? Will any gentleman be pleased, candidly, fairly, and without
sophistry, to show us what remains? There is no limitation. It goes to every thing. The inferior
courts are to be as numerous as Congress may think proper” (521). He is always concerned with
the role of the states in the judiciary.
Regarding Art. 4, he says, “…on some former part of the investigation of this subject,
gentlemen were pleased to make some observations on the security of property coming within
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this section. It was then said, and I now say, that there is no security; nor have gentlemen
convinced me of this” (585). He doesn’t like this article.
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Mr. James Madison
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Madison’s role in this convention is to answer points of confusion to the language of
the Constitution, but he does also defend it quite often as well. “Comparisons have been made
between the friends of this Constitution and those who oppose it: although I disapprove of such
comparisons, I trust that, in point of truth, honor, candor, and rectitude of motives, the friends of
this system, here and in other states, are not inferior to its opponents” (86). Mr. Madison is a
clear supporter of the Constitution.
Speaking to principle sovereignty, he says, “Who are parties to it? The people — but not
the people as composing one great body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties”
(94). Mr. Madison is clearly in favor of the people as principle sovereign, and a union structure
of government. He continues, “Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the
assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment; and, as a majority
have adopted it already, the remaining states would be bound by the act of the majority, even if
they unanimously reprobated it” (94). He is in favor of this consolidated government, but he is
trying to play it down a little bit to appease the opposition. He continues, “It is almost certain,
therefore, that the deliberations of the members of the federal House of Representatives will be
directed to the interest of the people of America” (97). This shows Mr. Madison’s understanding
of the people as principle as well as a union, because those two concepts go hand in hand.
Further, he clarifies his understanding of a union, saying, “If we recur to history, and review the
annals of mankind. I undertake to say that no instance can be produced, by the most learned man,
of any confederate government that will justify a continuation of the present system, or that will
not demonstrate the necessity of this change, and of substituting, for the present pernicious and
fatal plan, the system now under consideration, or one equally energetic” (129). Here, he directly
shows the problems with a confederacy and why a union structure makes more sense. He thinks
that having a new, more energetic government is necessary to the continuance of America.
Without this, the country will continue to suffer under a government which cannot help the
people in terms of national security and many other protections.
Regarding Art. 1, he says, “But the honorable member sees great danger in the provision
concerning the militia. This I conceive to be an additional security to our liberty, without
diminishing the power of the states in any considerable degree” (89-90). Madison agrees with
this provision, and since we know that he helped draft the document, it is reasonable to assume
that he is aware of the grant of power present in the document, and also that he is okay with it,
showing his support for strong derived sovereignty. He continues, “It can be of little advantage
to those in power to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people” (95). He doesn’t
understand the argument of the opposition that the representatives of the people will abuse their
power because it works against their whole purpose. If they disobey the will of the people, then
they immediately defy the only reason they hold any power at all, and the people will vote them
out of office. When speaking to Sec. 8, he says, “It would be then necessary to give this power to
the government, or run the risk of national annihilation. It is my firm belief that, if a hostile
attack were made this moment on the United States, it would flash conviction on the minds of the
citizens of the United States of the necessity of vesting the government with this power, which
alone can enable it to protect the community” (248-249). Madison thinks it indispensable to vest
the power of the militia and of taxation to Congress. Without this, the people would suffer
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greatly if there happened to ever be a national security threat on the country. He continues, “But
it may be answered that, under the state governments, concurrent executions cannot produce the
inconvenience here dreaded, because they are executed by the same officer. Is it not in the power
of the general government to employ the state officers” (305-306)? He speaks to this issue when
addressing the balance between the state and general government. He tries to appease the minds
of the opposition by assuring them that the states and general government will both work to
create and manage the militia. Mr. Henry and his cohorts were adamantly against this clause, so
Mr. Madison was trying to make them more comfortable with the clause at hand so that they
would hopefully vote in favor of ratification.
Regarding slavery, he says, “Is it necessary that there should be a tax on any given article
throughout the United States It is represented to be oppressive, that the states which have slaves,
and make tobacco, should pay taxes on these for federal wants, when other states, which have
them not, would escape” (306-307). He says that slavery is included in the Constitution so that
the Southern states would be okay with ratification. Additionally, he says the taxes that are
charged on Southern productions of crops as well as the slaves themselves will be useful to the
general government to maintain their economy. He poses slavery and its inclusion in the
Constitution as being beneficial to the status of the union, but the opposition didn’t quite believe
him. He also speaks to the inclusion of slavery as being a sort of representation of the state
structure in America, saying, “I make one more observation on what fell from my honorable
friend. He says that the true difference between the states lies in this circumstance — that some
are carrying states and others productive, and that the operation of the new government will be,
that there will be a plurality of the former to combine against the interest of the latter, and that
consequently it will be dangerous to put it in their power to do so” (312). As he sees it, there are
carrying states and production states. The Southern states are production states, and they need
help from the carrying states to stay afloat. If the general government didn’t collect taxes from
both of these kinds of states, the union would fall. The nature of the economy in America is a
give and take between the carrying and production states. The rest of the discussion of Article 1
Mr. Madison spends defending the Constitution.
Speaking to Article 2, he says, “It was found difficult in the Convention, and will be
found so by any gentleman who will take the liberty of delineating a mode of electing the
President that would exclude those inconveniences which they apprehend. I would not contend
against some of the principles laid down by some gentlemen, if the interests of some states only
were to be consulted” (494). He is responding to the opposition’s rejection of the mode of
election for the President. So, Mr. Madison is trying to explain how the state fits into the
equation so that the opposers might change their mind about some of their reservations. He
continues, “Difficulties would arise from the extent and population of the states. Instead of this,
the people choose the electors” (494). The presidential election system is a sort of hybrid
between a confederacy and a union, as Mr. Madison explains it. The people elect their state’s
electors, and those electors choose the president, though they typically base their votes for the
presidency on what the people want. They don’t have to do that however, they could choose to
vote independent of the people, in swing states mostly, and vote based on who they think would
be best for the job. Still, even with this hybrid proposal, the opposers to the Constitution weren’t
in favor of Article 2.
Mr. Madison was honest when it came to Article 3, saying, “I acknowledge that this part
does not stand in that form which would be freest from objection” (530). He realizes that the
language on the judiciary is not exactly the most protective of the people because they have no
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say in who gets selected and elected into the Supreme Court. He continues, “I believe the general
government will do what is for the interest of the United States; because they have no substantial
reason or inducement to violate their duty, nor are they warranted by this part of the plan to
commit the oppressions he dreads” (530). Despite knowing that there are problems with the
language, he still thinks that it is a good clause and it will work for the American people in the
end. As he sees it, there is no point to the President choosing a weak nominee, as it will reflect
poorly on their political performance and may result in the failure of them to be reelected.
Speaking to Article 4, he says, “…nothing has excited more admiration in the world than
the manner in which free governments have been established in America; for it was the first
instance, from the creation of the world to the American revolution, that free inhabitants have
been seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such of their citizens as possessed
their confidence, to determine upon and give effect to it” (616). He likes Art. 4 and thinks that
it’s a great addition to the Constitution.
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Mr. Lee (of Westmoreland)
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Lee is in favor of the Constitution. He says, “These, sir, are owing to the imbecility
of the Confederation; to that defective system which never can make us happy at home nor
respectable abroad” (43). This came after Mr. Henry’s dispute over the opening language of the
Constitution, “We the People” vs. “We the States”. He says that Mr. Henry’s account is
ridiculous, and he likes the former form. This shows his support of a union structure of
government. He continues, “I cannot understand the implication of the honorable gentleman,
that, because Congress may arm the militia, the states cannot do it: nor do I understand the
reverse of the proposition. The states are, by no part of the plan before you, precluded from
arming and disciplining the militia, should Congress neglect it” (178). This shows even further
his commitment to the union. He doesn’t think that the state governments need any extensive
power, and that Congress should hold most, if not all of that extensive power. This also alludes
to his understanding of strong derived sovereignty.
Further, he also supports the people as principle sovereign. He says, “I say that this new
system shows, in stronger terms than words could declare, that the liberties of the people are
secure. It goes on the principle that all power is in the people, and that rulers have no powers but
what are enumerated in that paper” (185-186). He sees this Constitution as being a mode by
which to secure the liberties of the people as well as respond to their desires in government. He
continues, “Candor must confess that it is infinitely more attentive to the liberties of the people
than any state government” (186). Here, he shows his support both for the union and the people
as principle. He speaks to the people as principle because he shows that this new government is
working directly for their need, supposing that they will be in charge of what government does,
and a union because he says that he prefers the mode just spoken of to a confederacy with the
state governments as principle.
Speaking to derived sovereignty, he says, “If, then, the House of Commons was so
powerful, no danger can be apprehended that our House of Representatives is not amply able to
protect our liberties” (43). He thinks that the grant of power to Congress is necessary to protect
the liberties of the people. His last speech regarding derived sovereignty was generally arguing
with Mr. Mason’s understanding of Article 4 (586).
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Mr. Corbin
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Corbin doesn’t enter the debate until he finds something to argue with Mr. Henry
about. Mr. Henry expresses his rejection of the phrase “We the People”, and Mr. Corbin
responds to him by saying, “I expected no such objection as this. Ought not the people, sir, to
judge of that government whereby they are to be ruled” (105)? Mr. Corbin shows his
understanding of the people as principle with this statement. He continues, “Liberty in such a
petty state, must be on precarious footing; its existence must depend on the philanthropy and
good nature of its neighbors” (107). This shows Mr. Corbin’s understanding that the people
control their own liberty, and this Constitution will protect it with its notion of the people as
principle sovereign.
Mr. Corbin can also be described as understanding strong derived sovereignty. He says,
“The powers of the general government are only of a general nature, and their object is to
protect, defend, and strengthen the United States” (107). The reason for the strong derived
sovereignty is to protect the will of the people, Mr. Corbin understands. He continues, “Sir, if it
be not vested with the power of commanding all the resources of the state when necessary, it will
be trifling. Wars are much (and more) carried on by the length of the purse, as by that of the
sword. They cannot be carried on without money” (109). Mr. Corbin finds it necessary to the
security of the people for the general government to hold extensive derived powers. As the
debate continues, Mr. Corbin remains pretty quiet on the topic of derived sovereignty. But he
does speak up again with regard to Section 10 speaking in favor of this clause as it pertains to the
Mississippi River and expansion of the United States (364).
With regard to the confederation/union distinction, Mr. Corbin says, “It is denominated
by some a federal, by others a consolidated government. The definition given of it by my
honorable friend (Mr. Madison) is, in my opinion, accurate. Let me, however, call it by another
name -- a representative federal republic, as contradistinguished from a confederacy. The former
is more wisely constructed than the latter; it places the remedy in the hands which feel the
disorder: the other places the remedy in those hands which cause the disorder” (107). Though
Mr. Corbin calls it by a different name, this is an expression of a union form of government. The
different name speaks to Mr. Corbin’s attempt at recruiting the opposers to ratification.
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Mr. Monroe
Confederacy, State Governments, Weak
Mr. Monroe does not join the debate until later in the convention. When he does, he
speaks to his support for the confederacy, saying, “...if we consider our comparative situation, we
shall find that nothing can be adduced, from any of them, to warrant a departure from a
confederacy to a consolidation, on the principle of inefficacy in the former to secure our
happiness” (211). He clearly supports the revival of the confederacy, and not the consolidation to
a general government. Further, this also expresses his understanding of weak derived sovereignty
because he thinks that the union, solely through existing, will abuse the people and not protect
their liberties.
Mr. Monroe continues, “What is the form of our state governments? They are all similar
in their structure -- perfectly democratic. The freedom of mankind has found an asylum here
which it could find nowhere else. Freedom of conscience is enjoyed here in the fullest degree”
(211). Mr. Monroe supports the state governments as principle sovereign because he likes the
current confederacy and thinks that it’s doing a good job. To this end, he does not want the
principle sovereignty to shift to the people because that typically warrants a union. Further, this
also shows his support for weak derived sovereignty because he, again, thinks that the union
infringes upon the liberties of the people, and he thinks that the confederacy gives people the
freedom they need/deserve. Adding to this, he says, “I am strongly impressed with the necessity
of having a firm national government; but I am decidedly against giving it the power of direct
taxation, because I think it endangers our liberties” (217). Mr. Monroe also doesn’t like the
actual grant of power given to Congress through the Constitution, showing even further his
understanding of weak derived sovereignty.
When discussing Article 2, he says, “…and that our circumspection should be
commensurate to the extent of the powers delegated, — proceeded as follows: The President
ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and punishments, which are the strongest
incentives to human actions” (488). He doesn’t like the role of the president because he thinks
that it undermines the state governments. He continues, “I believe that he will owe his election,
in fact, to the state governments, and not to the people at large” (488). He thinks that the
President should be selected by electors and not the people. He bases his argument against this
Section on the basis that the President would be responding to the state legislatures more so than
the American people.
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Mr. John Marshall
Union, People, Strong
John Marshall is also a late speaker at this convention. He first speaks up about halfway
through the debate, saying, “We prefer this system to any monarchy, because we are convinced
that is has a greater tendency to secure our liberty and promote our happiness. We admire it,
because we all think it a well-regulated democracy” (222). This shows Mr. Marshall’s
understanding of a union, as it secures our liberties and promotes our happiness.
Regarding derived sovereignty, he says, “If, on mature consideration, the Constitution
will be found to be perfectly right on the subject of treaties, and containing no danger of losing
that navigation, will he still object? Will he object because eight states are unwilling to part with
it? This is no good ground of objection” (224). He says this in response to the opposition with
regard to the Mississippi River and its exploration. The delegates against ratification argued that
Sec. 10 will infringe upon the state’s rights to explore the Mississippi River and make it a federal
quest instead. Mr. Marshall rejects this in the stated quote, because there’s no reason to give up
this navigation, in his eyes. There’s no difference between the state’s claim and the union’s claim
to this land, because they are one in the same. He also agrees that Congress should hold the
power of taxation (226). He continues, “The prosperity and happiness of the people depend on
the performance of these great and important duties of the general government. Can these duties
be performed by one state? Can one state protect us, and promote our happiness?...Virginia
cannot do these things. How, then, can they be done? By the national government only” (226).
This shows his understanding of strong derived sovereignty.
When the third Article comes to question, he says, “That many benefits will result from
this to the members of the collective society, every one confesses. Unless its organization be
defective, and so constructed as to injure, instead of accommodating, the convenience of the
people, it merits our approbation” (551). He agrees with the Article at hand, but only to the
extent that he thinks that a proper judiciary is necessary. He continues, “Gentlemen have gone on
an idea that the federal courts will not determine the causes which may come before them with
the same fairness and impartiality with which other courts decide. What are the reasons of this
supposition” (552)? This further shows Mr. Marshall’s commitment to Article 3. He does have
one problem however, “Has the government of the United States power to make laws on every
subject? Does he understand it so? Can they make laws affecting the mode of transferring
property, or contracts, or claims, between citizens of the same state? Can they go beyond the
delegated powers? If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it
would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to
guard” (553). He doesn’t like Sec. 2 of this article, and presents some possible issues implied
there. He continues to have more issues with the remaining sections,
Regarding principle sovereignty, Mr. Marshall says, “The state governments did not
derive their powers from the general government; but each government derived its powers from
the people, and each was to act according to the powers given it” (419). This shows his
commitment to the people as principle as well as his understanding of strong derived
sovereignty.
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Mr. Grayson
Hybrid, State Governments, Weak
Mr. Grayson doesn’t enter the debate until the middle of it, but once he does, he becomes
very vocal in speaking against the Constitution. He opens by saying, “I do not pretend to say that
the present Confederation is not defective. Its defects have been actually experienced. But I am
afraid that they cannot be removed” (273). Mr. Grayson knows that the Confederation needs to
be changed, but he doesn’t think that these Articles are possible to change. He suggests a sort of
hybrid between a union and a confederacy to resolve this problem. He says, “Under a
supposition that mankind can govern themselves, I would recommend that the present
Confederation should be amended” (278). He agrees that the people should be responsible and
content with their government, but he doesn’t think that a consolidation is a good answer either.
He continues, “Give Congress the regulation of commerce. Infuse new strength and spirit into
the state governments; for, when the component parts are strong, it will give energy to the
government, although it be otherwise weak” (278). He tries to combine a union and a
confederacy into a sort of hybrid system of government. He thinks that the states and the federal
government should work together under the larger umbrella of the general government, rather
than stripping the states of their power as the Constitution does.
Regarding derived sovereignty, Mr. Grayson says, “As to direct taxation -- give up this,
and you give up every thing, as it is the highest act of sovereignty: surrender up this inestimable
jewel, and you will throw away a pearl richer than all your tribe” (280). He doesn’t like the grant
of the purse to Congress, because then they are the sole central power. If Congress gets this
power, then it will completely undermine the role of the state governments in Mr. Grayson’s
hybrid model shown here. Mr. Grayson continues to have issues with Secs. 8, 9 and 10 of the
Constitution, and speaks against them in terms of derived sovereignty as well (pgs 280, 350, 371372, respectively).
Speaking to Art. 2, he says, “The executive is still worse, in this respect, than the
democratic branch. He is to be elected by a number of electors in the country; but the principle is
changed when no person has a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, or when
more than one have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes; for then the lower house
is to vote by states” (490). Mr. Grayson is adamantly against Art. 2. He doesn’t understand it and
thinks it makes little sense. He continues, “How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will
you call him before the Senate? They are his counsellors and partners in crime. Where are your
checks? We ought to be extremely cautious in this country. If ever the government be changed, it
will probably be into a despotism” (491).
Mr. Grayson supports the state legislatures as principle sovereign. He says, “But have the
people the power of making honest men be elected? If he be an honest man, and his wages so
low that he could not pay for his expenses, he could not serve them if elected. But there are many
thirsting after offices more than public good” (375). This shows his problem with the people as
principle: he doesn’t believe that the people have the proper knowledge or understanding of the
government to be able to choose its representatives. He continues, “There are two sets always in
that house -- one, the landed interest, the most patriotic and respectable; the other, a set of
dependents and fortune hunters, who are elected for their own particular interest, and are willing
to sell the interest of their constituents to the crown” (375). He thinks that representatives elected
by the people will inevitably become corrupt and fueled by self-interest rather than the public
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good. To solve this, he thinks that there should be more checks on who represents the will of the
people in the general government. He, “acknowledged that all power was drawn from the people.
But he could see none of those checks which ought to characterize free government” (421). By
this understanding, Mr. Grayson supports the form of representation where the people would
elect their state representatives, and the state representatives would select the representatives to
the general government, so as to ensure attention to the job and lack of abuse of power.
When responding to Article 3, Mr. Grayson says, “With respect to the judiciary, my
grand objection is, that it will interfere with the state judiciaries, in the same manner as the
exercise of the power of direct taxation will interfere with the same power in the state
governments; there being no superintending central power to keep in order these two contending
jurisdictions” (563). He is also of the opinion that the federal judiciary undermines the state
judiciaries. And, he agrees that the states should be the principle for the judiciaries rather than
the general government/executive. He continues, “There is to be one Supreme Court — for
chancery, admiralty, common pleas, and exchequer, (which great cases are left in England to
four great courts,) to which are added criminal jurisdiction, and all cases depending on the law of
nations — a most extensive jurisdiction. This court has more power than any court under heaven.
One set of judges ought not to have this power — and judges, particularly, who have temptation
always before their eyes” (564). This is Mr. Grayson’s understanding of how the judiciary should
work.
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Mr. Wythe
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Wythe enters the debate at the very end, and he supports the union structure of
government. He says, “To perpetuate the blessings of freedom, happiness, and independence, he
demonstrated the necessity of a firm, indissoluble union of the states” (586). He continues, “But
the excellency of many parts of it could not be denied by its warmest opponents. He thought that
experience was the best guide, and could alone develop its consequences” (587). This shows his
commitment to the Constitution at hand, and it shows that he agrees with the grant of derived
power given to the general government. This is because he supports ratification as it stands,
meaning that he supports the grant of power already included in the language which is strong
derived sovereignty. It also shows his commitment to the people as principle because this is
presupposed with a union structure of government. Though these things cannot be definitively
proven, they are likely, and so can be assumed as such.
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Mr. Dawson
Hybrid, Weak
Mr. Dawson doesn’t speak in the debate until the very end, where he provides his
thoughts on the Constitution and all of its individual parts. He says, “But when I came to
investigate it impartially, on the immutable principles of government, and to exercise that reason
with which the God of nature hath endowed me, and which I will ever freely use, I was
convinced of this important, though melancholy truth, — that the greatest men may err, and that
their errors are sometimes of the greatest magnitude” (605-606). He doesn’t support the
ratification of the Constitution because he thinks that the representatives and other elected
officials will abuse their power or be a poor choice for the country as a whole. He continues, “It
may not, therefore, be improper for me to declare, that I am a warm friend to a firm, federal,
energetic government; that I consider a confederation of the states, on republican principles, as a
security to their mutual interests, and a disunion as injurious to the whole…” (606). Mr. Dawson,
like Mr. Mason and Mr. Grayson, suggest a form of government other than simply a union or a
confederacy. However, though he makes this suggestion he doesn’t really explain fully what this
means. He also doesn’t speak to his understanding of principle sovereignty, only to his rejection
of the union. To this end, it is likely that Mr. Dawson supports the state governments as
principle, but there is not enough evidence to support this claim, so he is unclassifiable on the
principle sovereignty dimension.
Mr. Dawson says that Section 8 “…appears to me to be big with unnecessary danger, and
to reduce human nature, to which I would willingly pay a compliment did not the experience of
all ages rise up against me, to too great a test” (608-609). He does not support Section 8,
supposing that he has an understanding of weak derived sovereignty. He continues, “Exclusive,
then, sir, of any consideration which arises from the particular system of American politics, the
guard established against the exercise of this power is by far too slender” (610). This is Mr.
Dawson’s response to Article 2. He doesn’t like the Article because he thinks that there aren’t
enough checks on the president.
He continues to speak to his understanding of the necessity of a Bill of Rights. He says,
“…nor are the liberties of the people ascertained and protected by any declaration of rights; that
inestimable privilege, (the most important which freemen can enjoy,) the trial by jury in all civil
cases, has not been guarded by the system; — and while they have been inattentive to these allimportant considerations” (610-611). He thinks that the Bill of Rights is necessary to having a
secure government for the people. He agrees with the sentiments of Henry and Grayson and
others that the grant of power derived in the Constitution is far too extensive with not enough
protections. The Bill of Rights secures that the people would hold their individual rights and
freedoms regardless of the potential abuse of power of the general government, because those
rights could not be disputed.
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Mr. Harrison
Union, Weak
Mr. Harrison mainly only contributes to the debate when called to for his committee of
privileges and elections. He did say, however, “He added some observations on the plan of
government; that it certainly would operate an infringement of the rights and liberties of the
people; that he was amazed that gentlemen should attempt to misrepresent facts to persuade the
Convention to adopt such a system; and that he trusted they would not ratify it as it then stood”
(236). He says this after the appeal to Josiah Phillips from the opposition. He claims that the
Federalists give a false account of his trial and story in order to show that the Constitution as
drafted is better than the one already intact. He thinks that these tactics of deception are pathetic,
and he calls for the stop of this. Further, he speaks to his understanding that the Constitution as it
is written abuses the rights of the people. This shows his support for weak derived sovereignty. If
he wants amendments and listed rights for the people (which would be the purpose of
amendments), then he must see the grant of power as it’s written in the Constitution as being too
extreme, and therefore he would want less.
Speaking to principle sovereignty, he says, “I call Heaven to witness that I am a friend to
the Union. But I conceive the measure of adoption to be unwarrantable, precipitate, and
dangerously impolitic” (629). Mr. Harrison does not speak to who he thinks should be principle,
but rather states that he likes the union. Typically, this would align with classification of the
delegate as resting principle sovereignty with the people, but this cannot be definitively said for
Mr. Harrison. He says, “Can it be supposed that the little states, whose interest and importance
are greatly advanced by the Constitution as it now stands, will ever agree to any alteration which
must infallibly diminish their political influence” (627)? He is concerned with the role of the
states in government, and he thinks that they should hold more power. This does not, however,
say that he understands the states to be principle, so we are unable to classify Mr. Harrison on
that point.

.
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Mr. Innes
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Innes is completely silent until the very end of the debate. Here, he says, “…and
every terrific and melancholy idea adduced to prevent what I think indispensably necessary for
our national honor, happiness, and safety — I mean the adoption of the system under
consideration” (632). Here, Mr. Innes clearly supports the adoption of the Constitution as
proposed without amendments. He continues, “In my humble opinion, it transcends the power of
this Convention to take it with previous amendments. If you take it so, I say that you transcend
and violate the commission of the people; for, if it be taken with amendments, the opinions of the
people at large ought to be consulted on them” (632). This shows his support for the Constitution
as it stands as well as showing his understanding for the people as principle sovereign. Regarding
derived sovereignty, he says, “Does not our existence as a nation depend on our union? Is it to be
supposed that their principles will be so constuprated, and that they will be so blind to their own
true interests, as to alienate the affections of the Southern States, and adopt measures which will
produce discontents, and terminate in a dissolution of a union as necessary to their happiness as
to ours? Will not brotherly affection rather be cultivated” (633)? To him, joining under a union is
enough to settle any tension in derived sovereignty distinctions regarding the differences of
states. Southern and northern states were fundamentally different in terms of most social aspects.
Most delegates to this convention were concerned with this difference in culture and were
worried that the derived powers of government would work to favor one region over another.
Mr. Innes rejects this, saying that there is nothing more important to this issue than joining under
a union because the government will not be allowed to choose favorites.
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Mr. Johnson
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Johnson also doesn’t speak until the end of the convention, saying “…my judgment
is convinced of the safety and propriety of this system” (644). Mr. Johnson is in favor of
ratification of the proposed system. He continues to discuss the implications of the people as
principle sovereignty and also to agree that this is the correct method, saying, “…that I plainly
see a security of the liberties of this country, to which we may safely trust” (645). He thinks that
the checks already placed in the Constitution are sufficient enough to protect the people, showing
his support for strong derived sovereignty. Given that Mr. Johnson has the understandings of the
people as principle and strong derived sovereignty, it can also be assumed that he supports a
union structure of government.
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Mr. Stephen
Union, People, Strong
Mr. Stephen shows his support for a union when he first speaks. The convention reports,
“He described, in a feeling manner, the unhappy situation of the country, and the absolute
necessity of preventing a dismemberment of the confederacy” (642). Given that the
understanding of a union presupposes the people being principle, it is reasonable to assume that
Mr. Stephen supports the people as principle as well. Following this, Mr. Stephen gives a long
fleeting metaphor for the Constitutional Convention and creation of the union, showing the
distress she was under during creation. Within this speech, he says, “She further bewails that all
she can raise by taxation is inadequate to her necessities” (643). This implies that Mr. Stephen
agrees with the extensive grant of power to the general government, showing his support for
strong derived sovereignty, because the power of taxation under the Articles does not support the
general government enough, according to Mr. Stephen.
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